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Abstract:  
 The accession of George I in 1714 saw Great Britain tied to the Electorate of Hanover 
in a personal union. This union would last until Victoria's accession in 1837 when, due to 
differing inheritance laws, Hanover broke out of the union. Traditionally, a personal union is 
considered to exist when two independent polities share the same sovereign, without any 
overlapping jurisdiction and administration. By the reign of George III, the only Hanoverian 
administrative body in Britain was the German Chancery in London. Designed to serve as a 
conduit between the sovereign and his Hanoverian officials, the German Chancery was 
theoretically nothing more than a glorified post office. The Napoleonic Wars changed all this.  
 
 Hanover spent much of the war under foreign occupation. This caused the German 
Chancery in London, led by the ambitious Count Münster, to function as a government in 
exile. Through the examination of diplomatic correspondence, Münster's private letters, and 
the reports of military personnel, this thesis examines how the Hanoverian faction sought to 
influence British policy for their own interests, and fought to retain autonomy when infringed 
upon by Westminster. Previous studies have claimed that the personal union, as a political 
construct, does not fit the political relationship between George III's domains, offering 
composite monarchy as a substitute. The findings within this thesis supports the premise that 
a personal union is too rigid a term in its current state, but rejects composite monarchy. 
Influence was cultivated by both Hanoverians and Britons alike, but wielded on a pragmatic 
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For over a decade, scholars of the Napoleonic period have started to reassess the 
importance of second tier states in Europe which had been neglected in favour of five great 
powers: Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This list could be extended to include 
Spain, although its history is sometimes written in an ancillary capacity to the British 
experience of the war. This interest in pursuing the experience of the ‘lesser states’ has 
developed all the more since the bicentenary of the conflict, with a wealth of new literature 





 or Napoleon’s relationship with the Hungarian estates.
3
 A topic that has 
received much attention and has benefited largely from this revived interest, is what is 
traditionally termed the ‘Third Germany’. Abigail Green noted that the scholarly interest in 
the 'Third Germany' was a conscious attempt to move away from the predominant narratives 
of Austrian and Prussian histories. She claimed, quite convincingly, that the Borussianism 
school that preceded revisionists had attempted to portray German history to reflect 
contemporary politics of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century's.
4
 As such scholars 
of the 'Third Germany' focused on the middle and lesser states of Germany.
5
 Green's points 
reflect the increasing emphasis that is being placed on the need to examine the affairs of the 
smaller states of the former Holy Roman Empire, and how they traversed the tumultuous 
                                                          
1
 Joep Schenk, 'The Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine', in Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan, 
and Brian Vick, Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture, (Cambridge, 
2019), pp. 75-94. 
2
 Anita Čerpinska, 'Riga Export Trade at the Time of the Continental Blockade (1807-1812)', in Katherine 
Aaslestad and Johan Joor (eds.), Revisiting Napoleon's Continental System, (Hampshire, 2015), pp. 241-258. 
3
 Orsolya Szakάly, 'Opportunity or Threat? Napoleon and the Hungarian Estates',  in Michael Rowe (ed.), 
Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State-formation in an Age of Upheaval, c. 1800-1815, 
(Hampshire, 2003), pp. 153-168. 
4
 Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany, (Cambridge, 
2001), p. 8. 
5
 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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period of the Napoleonic Wars. Brendan Simms echoes these sentiments in the introduction 
of his edited collection of essays, The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714-1837.
6
 
While recent scholars have taken an interest in re-examining the place of Hanover in British 
historical discourse, the typical approach had been to side-line the former electorate. This, 
Simms explains, is partly because the Hanoverian connection did not fit the narrative of 
British history being an 'island story'.
7
 Anything that countered the idea of Britain being the 
sole protagonist in its own theatrical production was thrown aside. Thankfully, with 
revisionism seeking to move the historical narrative on from the hegemony of the former 
Great Powers, the full impact of the 'lesser states' is now being brought to the spotlight. The 
result of this ongoing research, in regards to the 'Third Germany', has been the formation of a 
new narrative, one that supplements and critiques older works that placed an emphasis on the 
decline of the Habsburgs, or the ascendancy of Prussia. 
Studying the experiences of smaller states such as Bavaria, Württemberg, or Baden 
can enhance our understanding of the period greatly, by revising and scrutinising their 
influence.
8
 That said, much more can be done, and one former electoral state has received 
less attention than it is due. The former Electorate of Hanover is singularly placed not just to 
add to the historiography of the ‘Third Germany’, but to enhance our understanding of 
Britain’s affiliated position with the Holy Roman Empire, due to the succession of the 
Electoral House of Guelph to the British throne.
9
 In the case of the lesser German states' 
                                                          
6
 Brendan Simms & Torsten Riotte (eds.), The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714-1837, 
(Cambridge, 2010). 
7
 Ibid., pp 1-2. 
8
 The study of 'Third Germany' has received increasing scholarly interest in the last ten years. For instance, 
focused pieces like Markus J. Prutsch, Making Sense of Constitutional Monarchism in Post-Napoleonic France 
and Germany', (Eastbourne, 2013) provide comparisons between the smaller states, in this case Bavaria and 
Baden. Other works investigate how the smaller states interacted with the Great Powers of Austria and Prussia, 
thus revising the one-sided narratives produced in the 20th century. One work that accomplishes this is Jasper 
Heinzen, Making Prussians, Raising Germans, (Cambridge, 2017), who investigates how Prussia sought to 
integrate the peoples and cultures of annexed territories post-1866. 
9
 One such work that investigates the relationship between Britain and Hanover over issues relating to the Holy 
Roman Empire is, Jeremy Black, Continental Commitment: Britain, Hanover and interventionism 1714-
1793,(Oxon, 2005).  
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relations with Britain, Hanover is unique in this respect. Through its' dynastic ties, Hanover 
provided Britain with a natural gateway into the geo-political melting pot that was Central 
Europe during this period; a diplomatic boon that the Guelphic Electors could offer with 
particular ease, due to their residency in London. The period between 1802 and 1815 in 
particular allows for a deeper examination of Britain’s relationship with its continental 
partner, due to Hanover suffering foreign occupation for much of the war.
10
 How Hanoverian 
and British statesmen adjusted to this fact is a subject that deserves more attention.  To 
examine the Hanoverian impact on Britain’s experience of the Napoleonic War effectively, 
three key elements, each covered in their own dedicated chapter, demand scrutiny: the 
influence of Hanoverian statesmen resident in Britain, the union’s impact on the war effort 
and, crucially, the bilateral relationship throughout the peace process. Each element merits 
more comprehensive research, and while these micro-historical studies are examined 
concisely, this thesis aims to shed light on the Anglo-Hanoverian union throughout the course 
of the Napoleonic period, contributing to a new 'macro-history' of the Guelphic dominions in 
Europe. 
 Of the three aforementioned elements, the first is crucial in providing the necessary 
context, creating a better understanding of the wider ramifications that are examined in the 
later chapters. Within chapter one, a large section is dedicated to understanding the views and 
actions of the head of the German Chancery in London, Count Ernst Münster. During the war 
period and the occupation/annexation of the Electorate, the Hanoverian Minister found 
himself to be the de facto government in exile, and his influence and position within the 
British political sphere transformed as a result. While the Elector remained the autocratic 
head of the Hanoverian Government, the Guelphic dynasty was required, by British law, to 
                                                          
10
 Torsten Riotte provides a good summary of this particular aspect, suggesting British Ministers were 
handicapped by their Monarchs Hanoverian policies. Torsten Riotte, 'George III and Hanover', in Brendan 
Simms & Torsten Riotte (eds.), The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714-1837, (Cambridge, 2010), 
pp. 78-79. 
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keep their Hanoverian and British interests separate.
11
 This resulted in the German Chancery, 
having no other administrative arms to answer to on the hostile continent, being the only 
body that could promote Hanoverian interests with the British authorities.  
 To examine this changing relationship, the first chapter of this thesis examines how 
the Count and the Elector reacted to the Prussian occupation of 1806, compared to the British 
reaction. This is a particularly important event for analysing the British-Hanoverian 
relationship of this period. Prussia had, until the occupation, been a target of British 
diplomatic overtures, the hope being that the descendants of Frederick the Great would join 
with Britain in coalition against the French.
12
 Naturally, as a result of the Prussian 
occupation, Hanoverians took a rather different view. How George III's two polities 
navigated this issue is instrumental in examining the political relationship between the British 
and Hanoverian Ministers. The rest of the chapter puts this relationship under further 
scrutiny, by investigating the political relationship between Whitehall and the German 
Chancery in the immediate years after 1806. In so doing, the typical attitude of the two 
administrations can be gauged.  
 The central part of this study places the attitudes and policies of Westminster and the 
Chancery within the wider context of the war effort after 1806. As the Napoleonic wars are 
an extensive field of study, the themes covered in the second chapter have been selected 
carefully, maintaining the aim to add a new perspective to existing historiography. To 
achieve this, two particular theatres of war were chosen: maritime and espionage. Espionage 
is a natural element of study when considering the impact of the German Chancery on the 
British war effort. Count Münster, prior to being the Minister in London, had built a 
reputation within the Hanoverian diplomatic service, and had represented Hanover in the 
                                                          
11
 Jeremy Black, 'Hanoverian Nexus: Walpole and the Electorate', in Simms & Riotte (eds.), Hanoverian 
Dimension in British History, p. 12. 
12
 Riotte, 'George III and Hanover', in Simms and Riotte (eds.), Hanoverian Dimension in British History, p. 79. 
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courts of the Italian peninsula and Russia.
13
 Once taking up his post in London, he 
maintained diplomatic contacts across the continent and, due to his proximity to the Elector, 
was in frequent contact with the Hanoverian representatives abroad. The retention of this 
second group of men across Napoleonic Europe allowed Münster to cultivate a network of 
diplomat-spies in lands bound to the French, and to pass on vital information to his British 
counterparts.  
 The study of maritime affairs on Anglo-Hanoverian relations is far more rewarding 
than first impressions suggest; the Hanoverians not having much of a sea-faring reputation at 
the time.
14
 However, the acquisition of Heligoland by the British would come to be vital in 
safeguarding Münster's communication links.
15
 Remarkably, the thoughts and opinions of 
British officers stationed on Heligoland provide some insight into British perceptions of their 
German cousins, Heligoland being a frequent terminal for Hanoverians travelling to and from 
the mainland. By examining both espionage and maritime affairs collectively, a deeper 
understanding of the Electorate's importance becomes evident. A beneficial appendage to this 
is that the British perception of the Hanoverian comes to light by examining the thoughts of 
British agents. When compared to social attitudes, gauged via the study of philanthropic 
efforts, the impact of the Hanoverian union can be seen at a social level. This is crucial in 
truly understanding political influence. An understanding of these social ramifications helps 
clarify the sense of responsibility British society had for the other subjects of the House of 
Guelph. By its very nature, any sense of social responsibility can alter the way we view 
Anglo-Hanoverian relations.  
                                                          
13
 George Herbert Count Münster, Political Sketches of the State of Europe From 1814-1867, (Forgotten Books, 
London, 2017), p. 7. 
14
 Nicholas Harding, 'North African Piracy, The Hanoverian Carrying Trade, and the British State, 1728-1828', 
The Historical Journal 43.1 (2000), pp. 28-29. 
15
 The acquisition of Heligoland became vital for British smuggling to counter the Continental System. Silvia 
Marzagali, 'The Continental System: A View From The Sea', in Katherine B. Aaslestad & Johan Joor (eds.), 
Revisiting Napoleon's Continental System: Local, Regional and European Experiences, (Hampshire, 2015), p. 
90. 
6 | P a g e  
 
 The final part of this thesis focuses upon the Anglo-Hanoverian relationship during 
the final stages of the Napoleonic conflict. The purpose of this is to determine whether the 
conflict itself had any lasting consequences upon the union in the subsequent period of peace. 
By initially focusing on areas of contention, such as debt or other diplomatic wrangling of the 
Vienna Congress, the relationship of the two administrations can be placed in its correct 
setting. The results of these negotiations, tied with the findings from the previous two 
chapters, will be able to determine whether the personal union had been effective during the 
war for each constituent part, while additionally placing a new perspective upon the post-war 
maritime relationship of the two. In the final stages of this study two key questions will be 
considered. Firstly, whether Hanover was indeed the 'millstone' around the neck of Britain as 
politicians and journalists of the time often complained.
16
 Secondly, whether the union itself 
was a beneficial entity or a hindrance. Ultimately, this study seeks to illustrate the importance 
of the Hanoverian connection, not only to understand its relevance in the Napoleonic era 
more completely, but to showcase the radically changed perspective of 'British' history when 
the Hanoverian link is re-established. 
 
Contextualising the Anglo-Hanoverian Union 
The succession of the House of Guelph to the British throne in 1714 was not a simple 
affair. Domestically, it caused the Acts of Union between England and Scotland in 1706 and 
1707.
17
 Parliament also had to consider the relationship the new monarchy would have with 
their previous possessions; in this case their original seat of power, the Electorate of Hanover. 
                                                          
16
 This sentiment is best depicted in a political cartoon following Napoleon's occupation of Hanover in 1803. 
'Boney in Possession of the millstone: museum number 1868,0808.7151', The British Museum: BM Satires / 
Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum, 
n.d, <https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-7151> [date accessed 05/08/2020]. 
17
 Jeremy Black, The Hanoverians: The History of a Dynasty, (London,2004), p.24. 
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When it became clear that the next Protestant heir would be of the Guelphic line, Parliament 
passed what would become known as the Act of Settlement in 1701— it stated: 
 That in case the Crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come 
to any person, not being a native of this Kingdom of England, this nation be not 
obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories which do 
not belong to the Crown of England, without the consent of Parliament.
18
 
This policy would later become the standard argument used by both the government of the 
day and the opposition to question any commitment to the protection of Hanover at times of 
war. The original intention was that Britain would never have to commit to the extension of 
Hanover’s territory within the Holy Roman Empire, and so would avoid getting dragged into 
whatever squabbles should occupy the German Princes at any given time. An additional 
factor behind this was that the reigning monarch could not amalgamate British and German 
forces and overthrow the British constitution
19
  
 Despite the principles laid out in the Act of Settlement, Britain regularly used the ties 
to Germany to employ German mercenaries to fight in their colonial wars. For example, 
Hessian troops could be found in the Americas, and Hanoverians were present in India.
20
 The 
Hessians themselves, although not being in the union, profited from such mercenary 
agreements. The Seven Years War in particular allowed the Landgrave of Hesse to bolster 
state revenue and grant his sons meaningful employment. Indeed, as Charles Ingrao pointed 
out, the various subsidy-mercenary treaties from 1702 to 1763 could have paid for half of the 
Hessian government's expenditure for that period.
21
 However, these military relationships 
                                                          
18
 Jeremy Black, Continental Commitment, Britain, Hanover and interventionism 1714-1793, (Oxon, 2005), p. 
25.  
19
 Bob Harris, 'Hanover and the Public Sphere', in Simms & Riotte (eds.), Hanoverian Dimension in British 
History, pp. 188-189. 
20
 For Hanoverians in Britain's Imperial dominions see Chen Tzoref-Ashkenazi, ‘Hanoverians, Germans, and 
Europeans: Colonial Identity in Early British India’, Central European History 43 (2010), pp. 221-238. 
21
 Charles Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State, (Cambridge, 1987), p. 127. 
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with the German Princes were distinctly mercenary in nature and had little bearing on 
Britain’s perception of their continental commitments, or the Hanoverians' perception of 
themselves whilst in British service.
22
 The Hanoverians' perception of themselves in a 
mercenary fashion is examined further by Michael Pavković. In his examination of the 
Westphalian Army, Pavković notes that while many of these Westpahlians
23
  served loyally 
and professionally as a result of their mercenary heritage; loyalty to the state was something 
the Westphalian's King, Jerome Bonaparte, would have to build up from scratch.
24
  
 During the Napoleonic wars, when all of Europe was engaged in hostilities, it would 
be logical to assume that the principles laid out in the Act of Settlement would provisionally 
go unobserved when Hanover was occupied in retaliation for British actions, particularly 
given the Hanoverians past military contracts with Britain. With a few exceptions, this does 
not seem to be the case. Only on rare occasions did Britain act primarily for Hanover’s 
benefit, and even on those occasions Britain would stress the independent nature of both 
countries. Yet there is evidence to suggest that Hanover retained a distinct presence in British 
politics and was able to benefit from the dynastic union, despite the war and the principles 
laid out in the Act of Settlement. This study seeks to address the intricate relationship 
between Britain and Hanover during the Napoleonic period in which, for the most part, 
Hanover as a state was under occupation/annexation from a foreign power, by examining 
how the union connecting these two states influenced British policy, extending into its impact 
on foreign affairs and constitutional questions.  
 
                                                          
22
 Tzoref-Askenazi, 'Hanoverian, Germans, and Europeans', Central European History 43(2010), pp. 221-238. 
Tzoref-Askenazi's work on Hanoverian identity is in itself an innovative study that while deserving, as a topic 
has had to be neglected in this thesis to retain focus.  
23
 A Napoleonic grouping of Germans predominantly consisting of Hessians, Hanoverians, and Brunswickers. 
24
 Michael Pavković, 'Recruitment and conscription in the Kingdom of Westphalia: The Palladium of 
Westphalian freedom', in Donald Stoker, Frederick Schneid & Harold Blanton (eds.), Conscription in the 
Napoleonic Era: A revolution in military affairs?, (Oxon, 2009), pp. 135-148.  
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Methodology 
 The principal aim of this study was to investigate the level of influence Hanoverian 
affairs had upon British political and diplomatic decisions. The approach of viewing British 
choices through the lens of Hanoverian actions was decided upon for two primary reasons. 
Firstly, as the more powerful of the two in terms of economic and military power, Britain (in 
theory) could pick and choose when to pay attention to its Hanoverian partner. The 
methodical approach that Hanoverian Ministers took to overcome this and influence British 
policy is the principal subject of chapter one specifically, laying the foundations for more 
critiqued policy areas in chapter two. The second deciding factor of choosing this research 
approach was my own unfortunate lack of proficiency in the German language. Although a 
very rudimentary grasp allowed me to discern roughly what the purpose of some German 
documents were, to attempt to scrutinize these archives and secondary materials would not 
have done those works justice, being detrimental to my own in the process.  
 In an attempt to move away from a purely Anglo-centric interpretation of events, I 
purposefully curated secondary material from a more international array of authors. In 
navigating the issue of primary material, documents from the Hanoverian Ministry in London 
were utilised to a significant degree. Fortunately many of these had been translated for the 
British Foreign Office by the Hanoverian Ministry. These included translated copies of most 
foreign correspondence being supplied alongside their original. In this way I hoped to utilise 
primary and secondary material that emphasised the Hanoverian position on a given issue, 
while analysing the British reaction based upon the information they were provided with. 
 Due to the language issue and the research approach taken, three key themes were 
chosen for particular analysis. Chapter one looks into the mechanics of the relationship 
between the Hanoverian Ministry in London and the British Government, particularly the 
10 | P a g e  
 
Foreign Office. By examining how the Hanoverian Ministry interacted with their British 
counterparts, we get to see the frequency of their communication, the depth to which it went, 
and any cordiality that was cultivated as a result. The strength of this is then examined by 
looking into the events of 1806, the year in which Hanover was lost to French occupation. 
How British Ministers reacted to this event is of particular importance in gauging the strength 
of their commitment to their Hanoverian partner at that particular time of crises. To achieve 
this, the records of the German Chancery in London were examined, with particular attention 
paid to that administration's primary Minister, Count Ernst Münster. His correspondence with 
the Foreign Secretary of the day, often including the aforementioned translated copies of 
foreign despatches, was crucial in exposing the frequency and detail of communication 
between their two respective ministries.
25
  
 While it became clear that Münster held particular prejudices that did not align with 
British policy, it was possible to acknowledge and even scrutinise these, in part due to the 
political history of the Congress of Vienna written by Münster's son in the 1860s.
26
 This book 
acted somewhat as a biography of the father, providing the son's point of view on the father's 
policies. While this should be used with some degree of caution (publication was an ominous  
two years after the fall of Hanover to Prussia), it provides for a deeper understanding of the 
Hanoverian Minister in London. Through the analysis of Münster's character and the 
relationship between his Ministry and the British Government the necessary groundwork is 
set for the remaining chapters to thoroughly scrutinize the level of Hanoverian influence on 
specific areas of British policy. 
 To understand the impact of Hanover on British politics fully, British policy areas 
were chosen that reflected Britain's main sources of power at the time, naval and economic 
                                                          
25
 Many of the documents held at the National Archives in the series FO 34 are illustrative of this. Of particular 
note are boxes FO 34/1 to FO 34/4 
26
 George Herbert Count Münster, Political Sketches of the State of Europe From 1814-1867, (London, 
Forgotten Books, 2017). 
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policies. As alluded to above, British Ministers are examined, but the depth of Hanoverian 
influence on the British can be found in letters that were penned in the naval quarters at 
Heligoland,
27
 the accounts of philanthropist societies,
28
 even in a dispute between a pair of 
grooms and a militia.
29
 Examining source material of this nature achieves two objectives. 
First of all, it shows that the Hanoverian union was not merely an issue for the politicians, but 
that it had penetrated society as well. This is of particular importance as social perceptions 
can in turn shape political outlooks. By looking into what naval officers thought of the 
Hanoverians, or how British law saw them in comparison to 'official' Émigrés, we can gauge 
the mindset that British politicians may have held when dealing with their counterpart at the 
German Chancery. The majority of the second chapter's source material is utilised in this 
way. By building on the material of the first chapter that contextualised the mechanics of the 
Anglo-Hanoverian political relationship, the material used in the second aims to gauge 
British perceptions of the Electoral connection, and what the German Chancery themselves 
were doing to build a working relationship.  
 As the concluding section of this thesis largely deals with the end of the war and the 
peace negotiations, much of the primary material concerns diplomacy. By its very nature, 
much of this material focuses on Hanover directly, such as British-Hanoverian talks over 
subsidies. Again, to maintain the question of the extent of Hanoverian influence, documents 
concerning, or authored by, Hanoverian dignitaries were essential. However, when examining 
the consequences of influence within a peace congress, the peace itself must be looked at to 
see if there was any lasting impact. To do this, two elements were considered: the Hanoverian 
carrying trade in the Mediterranean, and the financial condition of Hanoverian war veterans 
many years later. Whether or not Britain sustained these pensioners even after the termination 
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of the dynastic union will prove to be a clear indicator of the lasting influence the 
Hanoverians had upon British political structures. 
 With the groundwork laid out in chapter one, the exploration of war-time policies and 
social perceptions in chapter two, and the analysis of the peace process and the union's lasting 
impact for merchants and pensioners, we get a good illustration of the far-reaching impact of 
Hanoverian influence within British politics. Yet while this shows that Hanoverian influence 
was in place, to successfully answer the question of how influential Hanover was, some form 
of metric will need to be considered. To achieve this, the works of political theorist Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr. will need consideration.
30
 Nye's principle works on the theory of Soft Power details 
two differing forms of power. 'Hard Power' is the attempt to accomplish a goal through 
coercion or financial incentive. 'Soft Power' on the other hand, is a slower process that 
attempts to woo a third party to your point of view.
31
 This could be done through creating 
policies that others wish to emulate, or acting co-operatively on international projects, 




 In the case of Hanover and Britain, Britain relied heavily on its 'hard power', relying 
on its naval dominance and economic subsidies to counter Napoleon and maintain the various 
coalitions built against him. After Hanover's occupation, Electoral ministers had to rely on 
diplomacy and the reliance of 'soft power' to persuade British Ministers to utilise their own 
hard power for Hanoverian benefit. Evidence of this process can be seen throughout this 
work, but in particular chapter two, as we will see Hanoverian soft power reaching into wider 
British society, be it the general public or the British naval officer corps. As Hanover lacked 
extensive material assets due to their occupation, any success in focusing British efforts for 
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Hanoverian gain should be considered a strong indicator of an influential Hanoverian faction 
in British politics. 
 
Literature Review 
The Anglo-Hanoverian question is one area concerning the ‘Third Germany’ that 
lacks critical attention, with the exception of a limited assortment of dedicated works. While 
these focus heavily on various particular aspects, they are not extensive enough to explore the 
period as a whole. Despite this, works that focus on other themes and countries do at times 
feature the subject of Hanover and Britain. However, this is often in an auxiliary capacity that 
is complimentary to their primary focus. For example Sam A. Mustafa’s book Napoleon’s 
Paper Kingdom, the life and death of Westphalia, 1807-1813, covers the fate of Hanover in 
the introductory chapter before turning the focus on to the French-Westphalian relationship in 
the book proper.
33
 Additional supplementary evidence can be discovered in works that focus 
on other subjects, but use source material in such a way that the British-Hanoverian aspect 
can be examined first by cross-referencing the initial point the author makes with the origins 
of the sources used. For example, C. K. Webster’s work on the foreign policy of Castlereagh 
in 1812-1815 focuses largely on the British perception and response to affairs on the 
continent during the war. However, in providing the evidence to support his theories Webster 
relies heavily on the correspondence between Count Münster and his agents in the European 
courts of Prussia and Austria.
34
 This suggests that British foreign policy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe during the latter half of the period was in large part formed from the 
information provided by Hanoverian agents.  
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It is questionable whether the foreign policy of Britain in these years was only as 
influential as it was because of access to intelligence provided by the Hanoverian Minister. If 
this is the case, further lines of enquiry open up that have yet to be satisfactorily addressed in 
existing literature. These include why Napoleon allowed Hanoverian agents to act against 
him in the diplomatic arena as openly as they did, and did the British government reciprocate 
the aid given by their German cousins by softening their approach to their Hanoverian 
policies? The impact of Hanover on British policy during this period appears to have been 
overlooked in favour of studying the Great Powers of the period. This is an unfair dismissal 
of the influence wielded by Hanoverian statesmen and diplomats and the subsequent impact 
on British policy, whether this be diplomatic or domestic. To examine fully the influence of 
the Anglo-Hanoverian union, this study has broken down the existing literature into three key 
elements in line with the method of study already alluded to above; royal and domestic 
political studies, military and maritime affairs, and finally works that focus upon the peace 
process. With some notable exceptions, like the significant contribution of Brendan Simms,
35
 
Hanover is rarely the key principle of the existing literature, but by applying the methods 
mentioned above a clearer picture begins to emerge that can significantly add to the primary 
material and contribute to an emerging scholarly discourse. 
  Viewing the impact of the personal union on constitutional affairs from a Royal 
perspective is rather complex; as Hanover was an absolutist state George III (and when 
appropriate the Prince Regent) dictated Hanoverian policy. This meant that when the British 
Foreign Office acted against the wishes of Count Münster they were by extension acting 
against the wishes of the Elector. The consequences of such policy decisions must be 
examined, as should the subsequent tension that this must have placed between Westminster 
and George when he was playing the role of British sovereign; were disagreements between 
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Parliament and the Hanoverian Elector ever felt in the relationship between the King and 
Whitehall? The Act of Settlement disengaged Britain from the internal affairs of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and a general consensus amongst historians suggests that both George I and 
II consciously held a strict policy of keeping their sovereign states’ interests separate.  
 This opinion amongst historians extends to George III, with only some claiming he 
had keen Hanoverian sympathies.
36
 Tim Blanning writes that the official British view was 
that Georg Kurfürst von Hanover and George III King of England were two separate 
entities.
37
 While he expresses an overlapping influence, Blanning retains the distinction and 
argues that foreign events did not change this, that George III simply pursued his interests as 
Elector regardless of Parliament.
38
 This hypothesis in Blanning's case study of the 1785 
Fürstenbund is an excellent supporting argument of the personal union theorem. Provided 
that George III was able to retain a clear division of his sovereign personas, he could act as he 
wished within the constitutional limits of each one; regardless of whether acting as Elector 
frustrated the wishes of the British Cabinet or not. Doubtless, such action on the part of the 
Crown would cause tension between the Monarch and his British government, and could 
have further exasperated other, solely British, disagreements between the Crown and 
Whitehall. 
 There were plenty of instances when George III as King of Great Britain disagreed 
with his British Ministry, the most infamous being his opposition to William Pitt's Catholic 
emancipation policies after the Act of Union with Ireland in 1801. Peter Jupp theorised that 
Pitt's administration was in favour of Catholic relief because of the military and strategic 
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advantages an appeased Irish Catholic populace could provide the British Government.
39
 
Patrick Geoghegan's views support this hypothesis, he claimed that proponents of the Act of 
Union, such as the military commander Lord Cornwallis, believed that union without 
emancipation was worthless in itself.
40
 Support of union therefore, was to support Catholic 
emancipation, not just on humanitarian grounds, but for the strategic dividends that would 
follow. Regardless of Pitt's political motivations, George III is often documented in 
historiography to have opposed Catholic emancipation because of the coronation oath he took 
to defend the Anglican Church when he acceded to the British throne. Geoghegan points to 
an episode of rage that George III exhibited on the arrival to London of the Irish Peer Lord 
Castlereagh to further illustrate this point.
41
 George's refusal to give way on the Catholic 
issue led to an impasse that resulted in Pitt's resignation. 
 If the King could prove difficult and emotionally stubborn over specific issues, it is 
reasonable to assume that such feelings could carry over into the King's judgement of other 
matters. So, could the Elector of Hanover's disagreement with British foreign policy spill 
over into the relationship between the British monarch and his Ministers? The foreign 
policies of the German Chancery after Hanoverian occupation suggest that the Elector was 
committed to having their ancestral home restored. Due to the Act of Settlement, this was 
hardly a point the Elector could stress to Parliament as King of the United Kingdom. 
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Examining whether tensions between the Crown and Westminster existed because of the loss 
of Hanover is vital in understanding the impact of the personal union, and can add greater 
depth to current interpretations of Crown-Whitehall relations. However, it will be difficult to 
pursue, as the question will arise as to whether George III kept his Electoral priorities distinct 
from his British interests, or whether in this period they merged together as one but were 
hampered by the laws and politics of his British ministers. If this had been the case, it would 
have necessitated indirect political action through the German Chancery of which the Crown 
was autocratic ruler.  
The above lines of enquiry rest upon the assumption that George III, while a keen 
advocate of his Britishness, was also a keen Hanoverian. This single question of George III’s 
character is now in dispute amongst historians. While there is a general consensus that he 
wanted to keep his state's separate (as mentioned above), historians differ on the extent to 
which George adopted a Hanoverian policy at the expense of British interests. Jeremy Black 
went so far as to claim that George III went to great lengths to promote British interests to the 
neglect of those of Hanover, an argument supported by Peter Thomas and Uriel Dann.
42
 In 
opposition to this view, Brendan Simms and Torsten Riotte put forward arguments that call 
for a reassessment of George’s character,
43
 something which Blanning delved into with his 
work on the Fürstenbund (as alluded to above). The problem with the former argument is that 
it does not account for George’s actions in the years after the American Revolution. Peter 
Thomas argued that with George III’s succession the Hanoverian ‘problem’ was removed.
44
 
Thomas based this on George’s dislike of his grandfather. His supporting argument provides 
an impression of George having a teenage style of rebellious behaviour in adopting a hatred 
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towards Hanover, simply because his grandfather, George II, held the Electorate in high 
regard.
45
 Thomas went on to claim that George III’s reputed detestation of the Electorate had 




Such an argument seems both lacking and incomplete; whether or not George held a 
childish dislike of Hanover to begin with, Thomas appears to have ruled out any possible 
change in character as his reign progressed. This characteristic does not tally with George’s 
pursuit of pro-Hanoverian policies during the 1780s or at the turn of the century, a point 
Riotte and Blanning convincingly state, Riotte going so far as to bemusedly ask why the 
importance of Hanover to George III is lost on the academic community.
47
 Furthermore, if 
George III detested Hanover to the extent Thomas claimed, it begs the question of why 
George sent all his sons but the heir apparent (whom Parliament would not allow to go) to the 
University of Göttingen
48
. Encouraging a Hanoverian education for his children does not 
quite register with the rationale Thomas attempted to showcase. Likewise, if George III had 
no love for Hanover, would he have threatened to abdicate in 1783? Arthur Burns suggested 
that the King had hoped to continue his reign on the continent had he gone through with his 
threat of abdicating the British throne.
49
  
Accompanying this debate, the importance of the personal union appears to be further 
dismissed as unimportant, possibly due to the characteristics rightly or wrongly attributed to 
the King. For example, in J. Watson's 600-page work on the life of George III, the loss of 
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Hanover to the French after the recommencement of war in 1803 gets just a single sentence.
50
 
The importance of the union, embodied in the King/Elector, is widely debated and at times 
dismissed, the argument over whether George had any regard for the German state or not 
(and the consequences his beliefs would entail) only recently emerging as a topic of interest. 
The existing literature covering the British experience of the war is extensive. Two 
theatres in particular receive much scholarly attention, these being maritime and the 
Peninsular War. The latter of which, being the more geographically focused, has received a 
multitude of studies of various natures. The many works of the recently retired Charles 
Esdaile being prominent amongst these.
51
 However, despite the popularity of the 
aforementioned theatres, much is being done on topics of less public renown. For instance, 
Dr. Jacqueline Reiter's current research and upcoming book on Sir Home Popham may shed 
new light on the Walcheren Expedition.
52
 This expedition will be discussed in a subsequent 
chapter, as the connections to Hanoverian policy suggest that the German Chancery was 
lobbying the Foreign Office for military aid drawn from this military front.  
The problem existing literature has when it comes to joint British-Hanoverian efforts 
is that specific detailed works rarely move beyond histories of the King's German Legion 
(K.G.L.). These can range from the battalion's individual experience of the war,
53
 to studies 
of the British Army and its relations with German forces.
54
 As this paper aims to discern the 
political influence of the Electorate on British policy, the K.G.L. will not be covered in any 
great detail. The reasons for this are two-fold. Primarily, there is extensive coverage of this 
specific topic already within broader British military studies and so, for reasons of space, this 
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politically focused thesis has had to sacrifice this more military-based subject for other, more 
concise, political analysis. This leads into the second point. As an area of study, the 
campaigns of the K.G.L. are not directly relevant. However, their mode of entry into the 
British army, or their reason d'être, touches on political dialogue between Britain and 
Hanover, which will lend itself to this thesis. With the exception of the K.G.L., a shared 
Anglo-Hanoverian war effort has received limited attention. The second chapter of this work 
will aim to broaden this area of historiography into the maritime and espionage theatres, and 
subsequently analyse Hanoverian influence on these areas of British policy. 
The years 1813-15, the Congress of Vienna, and the Europe-wide consequences of the 
peace process have received much scholarly attention over the years, especially since the bi-
centenary in 2015. This has resulted in more dated works, such as Henry Kissinger's 
influential piece A World Restored,
55
 being surpassed by studies ranging from specific 
focused projects, to more substantial macro histories of the period. This has allowed for 
greater context of the early nineteenth century, and how Europe was shaped prior to the 
Industrial and Romantic periods. For instance, detailed contributions on the Congress of 
Vienna by authors Adam Zamoyski and Mark Jarrett have moved scholarly thought away 
from 'Great Power politics' respectively by emphasising the influence the lesser states could 
hold over diplomatic proceedings,
56
 and by providing an in-depth overview of the Congress 
system at large.
57
 This in turn helped to lay the foundations prior to examining the more 
specific case studies of regional history. A plethora of recent academic studies has provided 
scholars with works on the evolution of a European security culture,
58
 regional trade and 
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economic analysis of Napoleon's continental system,
59
 and crucially the transition from 
Napoleonic Europe to Restoration and Romanticism.
60
 In this vast library of new 
publications, the internal dynamics of the Anglo-Hanoverian union are more prominent than 
preceding decades, and will be detailed further in the final chapter of this thesis.  
The examination of two specific works helps to illustrate the legacy of Anglo-
Hanoverian relations in Hanover itself and adds to this growing area of study. Abigail Green's 
analysis of the Kingdom's of Hanover, Württemberg, and Saxony in the mid-nineteenth 
century suggests that the union was detrimental to Hanover in the long-term.
61
 By comparing 
industrial, artisan and population growth Green showed that Hanover was economically 
backwards in comparison to the other two Kingdoms throughout the nineteenth century.
62
 
This was partly because the royal court had moved to London when George I inherited the 
British throne, and Green suggested that royal patronage disappeared as a consequence.
63
 
More importantly was the absence of the Elector's themselves. With the exception of the 
period of occupation, the administration and running of the Electorate/Kingdom was 
entrusted to the Hanoverian nobility. Green argued that by the time the German states were 
ramping up their industrial sectors, the Hanoverians were handicapped by an entrenched 
landed nobility with agricultural interests and the political power to defend them.
 64
  This 
resulted in a lack of industrial development and a limited commercial centre. This analysis is 
important to consider throughout this thesis as no matter how influential the German 
Chancery proved to be during the war period under Count Münster, they failed to secure any 
economic advantage from the union that could have benefited the new Kingdom's long-term 
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infrastructure. Admittedly, some financial gain was secured in land acquisition as a result of 
the Congress of Vienna, but failure to innovate and reform left Hanover trailing behind the 
other German states.  
In a similar vein the work of Jasper Heinzen adds to some of the points raised in this 
study. In his work on Prussian state-building in the aftermath of that Kingdom's consolidation 
of northern Germany, Heinzen examined how Hanoverians adjusted to the new state they 
found themselves in. Importantly, one of the issues covered discussed how Hanoverians 
viewed themselves, in terms of what we would now refer to as national identity. While 
discussing the transition from Hanoverian to German identity, Heinzen pointed out that the 
Prussian's made use of Hanoverian symbolism, with which they attempted (with debatable 
success) to place regional identities within a larger 'German' character.
65
 This move from 
Hanoverian to German identity is touched upon when analysing the writings of a Hanoverian 
diplomat shortly after the Prussian conquests in the first chapter. Heinzen also referred to a 
Hanoverian desire for autonomy even after concessions to local nobles and legislature,
66
 and 
that groups with lasting loyalties to the House of Guelph remained prominent.
67
 This shows 
that the cultural and political shift from Hanoverian identity politics to German was by no 
means clear-cut or simple. These points will find parallels throughout this thesis in the 
arguments used by the German Chancery when in dispute with the British Government 
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Alternative Constitutional Perspectives 
The constitutional relationship between Britain and Hanover is itself a controversial 
issue that will be addressed throughout this study. The typical approach of viewing the 
dynastic union as a personal union has come under scrutiny by historians such as Nicholas 
Harding, who claimed a composite monarchy is a more suitable political category. Under a 
personal union, the countries in question share the same sovereign, each represented 
independently of the other. Yet in a composite monarchy one country is supreme, with the 
monarch presiding over both constituent parts as a single entity. The subordinate region, 
while retaining some autonomy, is subject to the dominant authority of the other. 
Additionally, a composite monarchy would pursue policies that would apply universally to 
the shared institutions of both states. On an international level, countries forming a composite 
monarchy are viewed as a unified whole. For the purpose of this study, a brief analysis of the 
two political theorems will help to contextualise each model and how they reflect upon the 
British-Hanoverian relationship. 
Composite monarchy was by no means a new feature of European politics by the 
eighteenth century. Indeed, historians have applied it to much of European history, some 
dating them as far back as the Angevin Empire of the Plantagenets.
68
 In a seminal article 
entitled ‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies’, J. H. Elliot analysed many composite states 
from the medieval to early modern period. Elliot builds upon the ideas of the seventeenth 
century Spanish jurist Juan de Solórzano Pereira, who described such unions as aeque 
principaliter. According to this idea, the regions that formed a union were to be treated as 
distinct entities with high levels of autonomy.
69
 The differences between aeque principaliter 
and personal union are apparent. In personal union's, the constituent regions were considered 
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to be entirely independent from one another. Under aeque principaliter, the regions could act 
with autonomy on a domestic level, but externally were recognised as a single entity under 
the unified dominion of their sovereign. One of Elliot’s examples that illustrated this was the 
marital union of Castile and Aragon. On an international level, Castile and Aragon were 
recast as a single entity - Spain,
70
 while domestically their internal policies differed 
substantially. Elliot noted that Aragon retained an independent nature, largely as a result of 
the constitutional differences with Castile. The King found it much easier to obtain financial 
contributions from the Castilian Cortes than the Aragonese, due to the traditional relationship 
the nobles of the latter region had had with their ruling house.
71
 With these conditions, a 
composite monarchy could take on a variety of forms, as each distinct region developed their 
own domestic governance independently of the other constituent parts. Moreover, the 
conceptual fluidity of composite monarchy has led some scholars to apply it to the British-
Hanoverian union. 
A leading advocate of applying the composite monarchy theorem to the British-
Hanoverian union is Nicholas Harding. His work on the subject, entitled Hanover and the 
British Empire, 1700-1837, is an exceedingly stimulating and original study as he entirely 
refuted the personal union thesis, replaced with his own nuanced take on composite 
monarchy. Part of Harding's critique of the Anglo-Hanoverian personal union theorem was 
that its' supporters, diplomatic historians, were forced to be ‘episodic’ in their approach on 
account of the time span that would need to be covered. This, Harding claimed, resulted in an 
insular representation of the dynastic union.
72
 In arguing against personal union, he relied on 
a reassessment of the term ‘empire’, expanding its remit to encompass composite monarchy. 
Harding agreed that composite monarchy consists of two or more regions, with one being 
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dominant over the others. He added that at varying times during the course of the dynastic 
union, the dominant position transferred from one region to the other.
73
 Harding adopted the 
term empire to describe the perception of dominance, thus British fears of subjugation are 
referred to as a fear of Hanoverian empire, and vice-versa. His argument could be clarified if 
the term influence were used instead of empire. Harding claimed that at times there were 
fears of subjugation on both sides of the North Sea, and this lends itself to the composite 
monarchy theory. For example, the British feared that their new sovereign would undermine 
their constitution with the aid of his German soldiers. This was an issue which returned 
sporadically throughout the union’s history.
74
 Harding used this to identify periods when the 
British were fearful of Hanoverian empire and the perceived possibility of becoming 
subordinate. Throughout ‘Hanover and the British Empire’, Harding deployed examples 
covering the breadth of the dynastic union to highlight episodes when Britain and Hanover 
each perceived a threat of subjugation to the other, be it militarily or through royal policy. He 
suggested that this perception undermines the thesis of personal union, to the point that it 
should be rejected as a political construct for the Anglo-Hanoverian union. 
An additional element when considering the term ‘empire’ is the 
constitutional/diplomatic relationship between Imperial States and their satellites. While the 
Napoleonic Empire conjures images of a European map painted blue, such a portrait is too 
simplistic. The French Imperium was a complicated network of direct vassals, satellites, 
allies and newly annexed territories. A recent article, by Ambrogio Caiani, detailed the 
political repercussions of Italian collaborators within the French Imperial monolith. At the 
beginning of the article, Caiani briefly put into context three alternate forms of subaltern state 
that could be found in Napoleonic Italy: the annexed region in the north west, the quasi-
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autonomous state of Naples in the south, and the satellite Kingdom of Italy in central and 
north east Italy.
75
 Under Harding’s terminology, all three regions would fall under the remit 
of a French composite state. Such an approach fails to appreciate the different constitutional 
(and practical) political realities that existed in the regions Caiani examined. That all three 
were subject to empire is obvious; empire as a political entity transcends composite 
monarchy. If reversed, it would be difficult to determine when a historian is referring to the 
political landscape of the composite state of an empire (e.g. French Empire), the dominant 
imperial region (France), or the relationships between the imperial state and its vassals 
(France and Naples).  
The alternate political concept of personal union is far more rigid in definition. The 
term was coined during the eighteenth century by a Hanoverian jurist, Johan Stephan Pütter. 
This coincided with the dynastic union of Britain and Hanover. Its initial use by Pütter, in 
Elementa iuris publici germanici in 1760, sought to analyse the electorate’s relationship with 
the recently acquired territories of Bremen and Lauenburg. He later amended the political 
theory to encompass the relationship between Britain and Hanover, in Beyträge zum 
teutschen Staats- und Fürsten-Rechte in 1777.
76
 In essence, the territories constituting the 
personal union were independent from one another, much like composite monarchies, and 
similarly the union had the same head of state. Unlike composite monarchies, such domestic 
autonomy was replicated in the realm of diplomacy and international relations. For all intents 
and purposes, each constituent part of the personal union was entirely independent of the 
other in all matters of policy, both foreign and domestic. The two did not form a single nation 
on the international stage.  
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The problem facing the personal union thesis is that it does not allow for the same 
level of conceptual fluidity as composite monarchy. Under current terminology, should two 
nations show any semblance of close cooperation, they are considered to fall within the remit 
of composite monarchy. When sovereignty is shared at a legislative level, or is hard to define, 
it pulls away from the strict definition applied to personal union, in which sovereign titles can 
be held within the same person but are treated independently from one another.
77
 Anything 
other than complete independence would cause a union to break away from the intellectual 
constraints of the personal union thesis. This is an overly rigid assessment of personal union 
as a political category. Several political concepts allow for fluidity in how they operate and 
are defined. For example, the Dutch, Venetian, and American Republics all operated 
somewhat differently to each other, yet retain the same moniker of ‘Republic’. Additionally, 
different levels of absolutism and state management could be found in the autocratic 
states/absolute monarchies of Europe. Furthermore, the constitutional monarchies of Poland-
Lithuania and England differed greatly in how they functioned on a political and electoral 
level. While in England the relationship between Parliament and Crown was settled in the 
Medieval period and evolved steadily, the Polish monarchy failed to establish an equilibrium 
between their own position and the influence of the Polish nobility.
78
 By the 18th century two 
entirely different polities existed, but are still referred to as Constitutional Monarchies in 
academia. 
 All the above political theories are far less rigid than those currently applied to the 
concept of personal union, and act more as umbrella terms for the type of political polity each 
nation adopted. This thesis will attempt to show that personal unions should also adopt this 
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elasticity, and in so doing demonstrate (that as a political construct), are capable of close 
inter-regional cooperation without falling into the category of composite monarchy. 
Composite monarchy stresses the existence of a partnership where one region holds 
dominance over the other, and more importantly its politics accept and adapt to this fact. A 
personal union, on the other hand, retains the distinct independent nature of its constituent 
parts, while providing for the option of cooperation without obligation. 
The dynastic union of Britain and Hanover was a complex entity that does not easily 
fit either composite monarchy or personal union as they are currently defined. The following 
study will prove that Britain and Hanover operated under a personal union, provided that the 
current understanding of the term is expanded to allow more fluidity. First of all, statesmen 
on both sides of the union stressed the independent nature of their own state from the other. If 
the need arose, they took action to defend this principle, as will be observed in an affair 
concerning Hanoverian grooms, the German Chancery, and the British authorities. Secondly, 
the extension of British policy to cover Hanoverian interests abroad can be viewed as actions 
not dissimilar to British attempts to aid their allies. This had been the case when Britain 
interceded with the Barbary States on behalf of Sardinia, an episode concerning maritime 
trading policy in the Mediterranean that can greatly enhance our understanding of the 
Hanoverian dimension. Finally, the absence of any policy originating from Parliament that 
jointly applied to Britain and Hanover as a single entity lies in stark contradiction to the 
composite state model. The British declaration of war on Prussia in 1806 does at first suggest 
British responsibility for Hanover in a manner not dissimilar to that of aiding a satellite, but 
this does not take into account other political events during that year. As the British 
government needed the King’s favour,
79
 the declaration was not made primarily to liberate 
Hanover, but more to gain political capital with the British sovereign. Taken individually, 
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each of these themes could serve as an indicator of composite monarchy; but when combined, 
a dynastic union emerges whereby each country guarded jealously its independence, whilst 
being open to the notion of cooperation and the opportunities that the union could provide. 
While acknowledging the sporadic and underlying fears of subjugation on both sides, such 
anxieties were ultimately inconsequential.  
The dynastic union was, in essence, a political entity whose constituent parts treated 
each other as allies and behaved towards each other in like manner. The union between 
Britain and Hanover was personal in nature, a union whereby each partner was able to act 
independently of the other. At times cooperation occurred, and grey areas concerning 
sovereignty certainly existed. This is particularly apparent in those policies relating to 
Hanoverian refugees. The ambiguity of the constitutional relationship during this period 
needs addressing, but to claim the relationship was a composite monarchy distorts the 
complex political situation. When stripped to its core principle, a composite monarchy 
requires a dominant state and subjugate vassal. Certainly, the subjugate partner could enjoy a 
high level of autonomy, but they were ultimately answerable to the dominant authority. The 
British-Hanoverian relationship does not fit this political theory. The core principle of 
personal union on the other hand allows for the executive power of both states to reside in the 
same sovereign body, provided that they treated their sovereign states in an independent 
manner when it came to international relations. This core principle certainly applies to Britain 
and Hanover, yet our present understanding of personal unions as political entities is 
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Terminology and Abbreviations 
 Due to the number of political unions that the British Isles experienced in the 
eighteenth century, there is a need to clarify the intended definition of some of the 
terminology used throughout the following work. The Unions of England,  Scotland and 
Ireland will not feature to a great extent, but when this does occur these will be referred to as 
the Anglo-Scottish/Irish unions to avoid confusion, later the traditional joint terminology of 
Great Britain/Britain/British. When referring to 'the Union', this will typically be referencing 
that of Britain and Hanover. For Hanover specifically, I will follow the lead of other scholars 
in expressing the difference of Hanover and Hannover, the former relating to the territory as a 
whole and the latter its primary city. 
 I have attempted to refrain from referring to the monarchy as the House of Hanover, a 
distinctly British moniker that undermines the spirit of this work. As such, the monarchy will 
be referred to by their ancestral name of Guelph/Guelphic. In relation to abbreviating archive 
locations, I will be following standard practice of mentioning them in full in the first instance 
before abbreviating thereafter. Of particular note, however, is the material held by the Society 
of Friends of Foreigners in Distress. As this is a source base that has received little scholarly 
attention and was, at the time of writing, held in private by the trustees of that charity, the 
relevant abbreviation I will use (SFFD) requires specific mention here. However it should be 
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Chapter 1: The King’s German Minister 
 
The influence of Hanover in British politics was a complex affair during the 
Napoleonic period. The popular response from British parliamentarians when discussing 
Hanover was to fall back on the official position of the 1701 Act of Settlement, the aim being 
to avoid any military commitment to the Electorate that might be asked for by either the 
Electorate’s representatives or by the Royal House of Hanover.
80
 The ambiguity of this 
position is astounding. For example, Hanoverian troops were employed by the British (prior 
to the Napoleonic Wars) to further their own colonial interests in India,
81
 with additional 
Electoral forces being deployed to Gibraltar for garrison duty.
82
 With such military assistance 
offered by the Hanoverians it would be understandable for them to have assumed some 
amount of sympathy for their position when the continental wars resumed in 1803. To a 
degree this was the case, however, as the wars progressed it became clear that British military 
assistance was not forthcoming. To understand this it is crucial to examine the opinions of 
British Ministers towards the Electorate and her representatives, while additionally looking 
into the efforts of the German Chancery and its agents to exert political influence in Britain. 
To complicate matters further, we have to consider the position of George III. In his 
capacity as King of Great Britain his hands were tied by the Act of Settlement. However, 
when events forced him to make a stand over Hanover we see a monarch who is both 
diplomatic in regards to the expectations of his British Ministers, while also forthright in his 
personal opinion of events, expressing a concern for his Hanoverian subjects that would be 
uncharacteristic of an indifferent Elector. To best examine the influence of Hanover in British 
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politics we should look to the relationship between the German Chancery and British 
Ministers, while touching on the role played by George III and the extended royal family.  
This chapter will establish three key points in determining the impact of the German 
Chancery during Count Ernst Herbert Münster’s time as Minister. Count Münster is a crucial 
figure in establishing the impact of the Hanoverian connection for a number of reasons, these 
being in the spheres of diplomacy, domestic/constitutional affairs and military strategy. Most 
importantly, we also gain insight into how the personal union affected the rights of 
Hanoverian émigrés in Britain, and so explore whether King George III’s policy to retain a 
separation of his two sovereign states was put into practice at all levels of society, and not 
just used by politicians to explain policy decisions. To examine these factors, we can look to 
the private correspondence of Count Münster as well as his state papers, and in so doing, 
realise that this was a man who worked tirelessly whatever the circumstances. His letters 
show his involvement in a wide variety of situations that his British counterparts had 
dedicated government departments for; for example, we see him dealing closely with the 
Foreign Office, the Home Office and the Treasury. His philanthropic work outside of the 
political landscape goes further still in emphasising the industrious nature of this particular 
politician. By being involved in all manner of domestic and diplomatic affairs, Count 
Münster, and the work of his department, grants us insight into the full impact of the personal 
union on Hanoverian subjects’ status in Britain, international diplomacy, and the war effort. 
 
The Hanoverian Minister in London 
To justify and contextualise the documents directly concerning the actions of Count 
Münster, one should examine how this man’s influence has been assessed over time. Brendan 
Simms and Torsten Riotte, both having written on the subject, are the first points of reference 
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with which to explore this issue. From there we can look further back, to an almost 
contemporary analysis of Count Münster, one written by his son in 1868. Yet due to the 
timing of this publication, and the nature of its contents, this in itself raises some concerns 
over its accuracy, and while not deserving to be disregarded, should be handled with caution. 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the personal union and its place in the British historical 
narrative has been severely overlooked, and Simms and Riotte both stated that Münster was a 
force to be reckoned with in his own right. Riotte argued that Münster was a wildly ambitious 
man, with a further insinuation of an almost Machiavellian attribute to his character. Riotte 
noted that shortly after taking office in London Münster orchestrated the dissolution of the 
Hanoverian political body in Hanover; a body that had secured his elevation to the post of 
Hanoverian Minister in the first place, the purpose of which it is suggested was so that 
Münster could elevate his own protégés.
 83
 Furthermore, the flurry of activity that Münster set 
in motion on assuming office led the British press to report on Hanoverian affairs, something 
that they had rarely bothered with until Münster’s time in office.
84
  
Count Münster also increased the activity between the Foreign Office and the German 
Chancery dramatically, the full significance of which is argued by Simms to have created a 
situation where the Foreign Office was manipulated by the Chancery in securing its own 
interests.
85
 On this particular note there is a cause of contention; while correspondence did 
indeed increase while Münster was Minister, whether he manipulated foreign affairs is highly 
debatable. The evidence put forward in this chapter will showcase that while Münster did 
indeed suggest points of policy that would directly benefit Hanover, the advisory nature of 
his remarks would suggest more a cooperative manner, and less one of underhanded 
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manipulation. Indeed, the blatant Hanoverian self-interest in many of the despatches Münster 
sent to the Foreign Office is not hard to miss, and as Münster’s Hanoverian agents largely 
operated in the German domains it is unsurprising that the subject of Hanover, and other 
powers' relations to it were a central feature in Münster’s correspondence. Simms focuses his 
claim of Hanoverian manipulation on the events of 1806, notably the King’s response to 
Castlereagh over the theoretical question of which power would be the preferential occupier 
of Hanover.
86
 The Elector’s response not being favourable to British policy is not in itself a 
manipulation of British policy. It is a response from one sovereign power to another. If that 
resulted in a re-alignment of Britain’s policy, then such is the way of international diplomacy. 
In comparison to his predecessors,
87
 Count Münster was a pro-active statesman and 
courtier, judging from his correspondence and newspaper articles relating to him. Various 
regional newspapers when reporting royal gossip regularly report him being in the royal 
entourage, whether this be a royal inspection of the Royal Horse Guards,
88
 a leisurely 
horseback ride through the London Parks,
89
 or even accompanying the Royal family to their 
Christmas service.
90
 This also gives a slight impression of Münster having the King's ear. 
This impression is further reinforced by Torsten Riotte. When Riotte addressed Münster's 
ambitious streak, he mentioned that in 1805, following the Hanoverian council's appointment 
of him as their representative in London, Münster caused the body’s dissolution within 
months of being in Britain.
91
 While Riotte used this example to float the possibility of 
Münster having great ambition and drive home Münster's political acumen, we can also 
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garner two further points on Münster's character. One being an almost Machiavellian 
approach to politics; Münster had no qualms in consolidating power at the expense of the 
men who had helped him to gain his initial appointment, the influence he thus obtained was 
extensive. With the dissolution of the Hanoverian administration in Hanover, Münster 
became the de facto government, stationed in London in the same building as the King, St. 
James's Palace. His political power and influence can only have increased as a result. This 
would have made his purpose in London more forceful as he could act freely, answerable not 
to a government body in Hanover but to the King alone.  
This suggests a particular ruthlessness on Münster's part, but it should be noted that 
his reasons for causing the Hanoverian government to be dissolved are disputed. Riotte 
argued that this could have been done to improve government efficiency, or so that he could 
place his favourites in positions of power.
92
 Regardless, this single action effectively 
transformed him from envoy to head of George III's Hanoverian affairs. His enhanced status 
and his proximity to the King would have made him particularly interesting to a British 
politician hoping to gain the King's ear. Indeed, we can see the trust George III placed in 
Münster by the fact that in early 1806 Münster is not in London but in Hanover, on a mission 
to the country to set the local governance in order on behalf of the King/Elector.
93
 Despite the 
fact that the Prussian invasion cut his mission short and Münster promptly returned to 
London,
94
 we can see that Münster was entrusted and expected to rebuild the governing 
infrastructure of Hanover personally (between the French and Prussian occupations), and not 
delegate it to another. Whether this was favouritism on the part of George III is debatable; 
Münster may have been the only credible man available at the time, but regardless this level 
of trust could only have increased his own personal prestige and influence as a result. 
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When it comes to Münster’s efforts during the war period, Riotte was a bit more 
generous in his description of the Hanoverian system, stating that Hanoverian agents were 
vital in securing and reporting secret correspondence to London.
95
 He stressed further that the 
Hanoverian Minister held as part of his office two vital political assets: proximity and 
knowledge of the British political arena, and direct access to the King.
96
 Riotte’s brief 
assessment of the Vienna Congress, and that Hanover was capable of not only regaining 
independence but also of gaining territory, suggests strongly Riotte’s opinion that Münster, 
who represented Hanover in the Congress, was an accomplished diplomat. Indeed, he 
stressed that most historians attribute Castlereagh with having constrained Hanoverian 
demands; demands that would have curtailed the ambitions of Prussia.
97
 It is this last point 
that attention should be drawn to. The suggestion that Castlereagh had to persuade Münster to 
stand back from Hanoverian expansion at Prussian expense is highly indicative that Münster 
was anti-Prussian in his beliefs, a point that is in sharp controversy with the professed views 
of Count Münster’s son. For the sake of clarity in the following section, the Count Münster 
who is the subject of this chapter shall continue to be referred to as such, and as his son was 
also known as Count Münster, he shall be referred to by replacing his title with his first 
forename, so he shall be referred to as George Münster.  
At first glance, the account written by George Münster in 1868 on the political affairs 
of Europe between 1814 and 1867 appears to be a well-reasoned political analysis explaining 
how Russia and the states of Germany had evolved over the period covered. Writing in the 
immediate aftermath of Prussian expansion in northern Germany, as a primary source for that 
period his work is invaluable. Through this document we gain an intelligent analysis from a 
contemporary diplomat, who as a Hanoverian national, was well placed to observe events as 
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they happened. Indeed, being in possession of some of his father’s diplomatic accounts from 
the Vienna Congress made him uniquely placed to analyse how the fate of northern Germany 
progressed over time. However, it is on close study of his account of his father’s politics that 
the son’s political bias becomes apparant.  
The examination of Count Münster’s private correspondence and his political 
declarations suggests political leanings that are in stark contrast to those suggested by his son. 
In short Count Münster was a staunch opponent of Prussian expansion, and his own words 
when describing the Government of Prussia are less than accommodating. His son however 
attempted to disprove this. He strongly suggested that his father was a staunch German 
nationalist, claiming his father was 'the centre of the patriotic movement for the freedom of 
Germany'.
98
 However, George Münster went on to claim that a firm German nationalist was, 
by extension, a firm Prussian nationalist and that the two were indistinguishable; furthermore 
the son claimed that while his father Count Münster was heading the Hanoverian 
government, the best possible 'understanding existed between them (Hanover and Prussia)'.
99
 
His reason for such a bizarre statement was that a true German nationalist should envision a 
united Germany or 'Bund',
100
 and that as the diplomatic route of mutual allegiance (as worked 
out at Vienna) had failed to achieve the desired results, a Prussian-led solution was 
inevitable.
101
 Unification, he argued, could only have been achieved by that Kingdom, and so 
all true German nationalists should support Prussia to that end.
102
  
As a result of this reasoning, George Münster suggested that although a diplomatic 
unity of the German lands as sought by his father had failed, it still qualified Count Münster 
as a German nationalist. In George Münster’s opinion the next logical step for unity was a 
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Prussian takeover. Therefore the diplomatic nationalists from the Vienna Congress still 
qualified as German, ergo Prussian, nationalists, as their vision for a united Germany in some 
shape or form had been their shared ultimate goal. Due to their shared heritage and language, 
Germans would naturally follow Italy in uniting on these grounds.
103
 Essentially, Prussia was 
merely facilitating that end. This leaves us with the quite ridiculous concept that Count 
Münster would have been in favour of a united Germany under Prussian rule. The following 
example will show that not only is that highly unlikely, but that Count Münster not only 
distrusted the Prussians, but actively worked to hinder the establishment of mutual trust 
between Britain and Prussia. Not to do so could have compromised the Hanoverian interests 
he was trying to safeguard. If Count Münster were to be as pro-German/Prussian as his son 
later suggested,
104
 these letters would simply not exist; nor would he have been supportive of 
his Sovereign’s own opposition to a Prussian occupation of Hanover in preference of a 
French, as alluded to above with Simms.  
In a letter to the Foreign Secretary George Canning in May 1807, Münster presented a 
translated despatch concerning the Prussian Minister Baron Hardenberg. In this despatch one 
of Münster's agents, Mr de Hugo, detailed Hardenberg's plans for Northern Germany should 
Britain aid Prussia in a suggested venture.
105
 What Hardenberg reputedly proposed was that 
should an allied force consisting of Britain, Russia and Prussia oust Napoleon from central 
Germany, a clear war goal was required to be agreed before-hand. Hardenberg's goal was that 
Prussia and Austria would become the guarantors of Germany, each being responsible for the 
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security of their respective spheres. This agreement was to be underscored by the powers of 
Britain and Russia.
106
 In effect, as de Hugo and Münster both saw it, Prussia and Austria 
were to carve up the German territories between them, imposing not necessarily a political 
governorship of other German territory, but a military one. In the lengthy document that 
Count Münster sent in accompaniment to a copy of Hugo's despatch, he provided a full 
analysis of Hardenberg’s scheme and his thoughts on it. These thoughts included Münster’s 
strongly held beliefs of the Prussian state in general. In a brief introductory analysis, Münster 
addressed Hardenberg’s plan as doomed to failure as it would never 'obtain the concurrence 
of those parts of Germany whom he wishes to rescue from the French yoke for no other 
purpose than that of subjecting them to an equally oppressive one'. 
107
 
This statement alone contradicts his son’s belief that, failing a diplomatic union of Germany, 
a German nationalist (to which he claimed his father was) would welcome a Prussian military 
union. Münster went on to claim that the military system that was the Prussian state was 
vexatious and intolerable on its own subjects, the more so as it was a military system that 
failed to defend them when the time came. Münster then claimed that the current troubles of 
central Europe stemmed from the Peace of Basel;
108
 a peace partly orchestrated by the same 
Hardenberg. He then exclaimed that the illegal occupation of 1806 left Hanover’s finances in 
ruins, and that even in neutrality Prussia damaged Hanover by opposing and denying 
expeditionary forces from Britain and Russia that could have aided the nation.  
 The rest of his letter continued in much the same vein; Prussia was essentially called 
out as a distrustful ally and a power hungry neighbour, even referring to Prussia at one point 
as being ‘the most vexatious Military System that was ever known'.
109
 He stated to the Foreign 
Secretary that, while the King could not order his British Ministers to follow his lead, he had 
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already instructed Münster to inform the Prussian ambassador Baron Jacobi that George, in 
his Electoral capacity could never condone the plan laid out by Hardenburg. Furthermore, he 
formally requested his British government to follow suit, Count Münster added for 
diplomacy's sake that Canning was better placed than he to make a British decision on this 
matter.
110
 This letter fundamentally closes George Münster’s argument in relation to his 
father’s views on Prussia, and by extension, calls into question his reliability as a source 
when referring to his father’s opinions in matters politic. It should be pointed out also that, as 
a diplomat of Hanoverian nationality, George Münster was presumably attempting to justify 
his father’s actions against Prussian expansion at the Vienna Congress for personal gain. To 
retain his position as a diplomat or even to retain some function in the new Prussian/German 
state, it is suggestive that he felt a need to ingratiate himself with his new Sovereign, 
something particularly hard for the son of a man so adamantly opposed to Prussia. 
 
The Year 1806 
The question of Hanover and its impact on the domestic affairs of Westminster are 
best understood by evaluating the events of 1806. This was a terrible year for Hanoverians 
and British alike. Hanover swapped one occupying nation, Prussia, for another, France, and 
in so doing would suffer large economic upheaval as a result of French requisitions 
throughout the duration of the war.
111
 Britain, on the other hand, saw the deaths of two 
prominent statesmen, an uneasy relationship with the Crown, and a coalition government that 
consisted of factions traditionally opposed to each other. The internal strife of the Guelphic 
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lands did not, however, prevent the effects of union from being felt. The disastrous peace 
negotiations of the year are a case in point.
112
  
It is debatable whether Napoleon wanted peace or not in 1806, but from a British 
perspective talks were over-complicated from the start due to Hanover. The Act of Settlement 
made clear there was to be no war for Hanover, but George III was able to apply enough 
pressure on a weak government that needed royal support to ensure that there would be no 
peace without it either.
113
 Simms implies that this was in part due to the work of Münster 
lobbying the Crown, Government and civilian officials.
114
 It could be argued that this single 
issue destroyed the credibility of the Ministry of the Talents, and discredited the primarily 
anti-royalist, anti-Hanoverian minister Charles Fox and his supporters in the process.
115
 L. G. 
Mitchell, in his biography on Fox, suggested that Fox had this single opportunity to prove 
that the policy of peace he had been advocating for so many years in opposition was crucial 
in securing not just his own goals, but the credibility of the troubled coalition of which he 
was a part.
116
 With the failure of the peace talks, Fox and his supporters had failed in a key 
policy they had advocated for years; a failure that, in part, was influenced by the need to 
negotiate terms favourable to the Elector of Hanover, regardless of the impact this would 
have on British bargaining power.  
It was not just negotiations with France that became problematic for the British 
politicians. Earlier in the same year, negotiations with Prussia came to an impasse over the 
question of Hanover. Brendan Simms passionately argued that it was only the issue of 
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Hanover that prevented closer relations between the two powers.
117
 Simms suggested that not 
only did George III convince the British Foreign Secretary that action against Prussia had to 
be taken as a result of their occupation (a small feat in itself considering foreign policy had 
been devolved to Parliament), but in so doing radically altered British policy towards the 
Prussians in the process.
118
 Simms even went so far as to suggest that Fox was a willing 
participant in the reactionary measures,
119
 a sharp U-turn in the otherwise pacifist policies 
normally adopted by the man. Unfortunately, the British reaction, a blockade of the north 
German ports and embargo of Prussian goods, did not improve life in Hanover. While Britain 
had uncharacteristically gone against its own policies of a close relationship with Prussia in 
favour of punitive measures because of their occupation of Hanover, by blockading the North 
Sea ports Britain prevented the flow of commerce down the rivers Elbe and Weser, which 
unfortunately flowed directly through Hanover. In this instance, the personal union had a 
profound effect on British policy, forcing it to defend proactively the interests of the smaller 
state, although the cost of this was a potential ally and the government’s credibility, as 
traditional policies that had been followed by successive governments were changed for 
Hanover’s benefit. How much of this was due to pressure applied by Münster or the Crown is 
a question to be investigated, as is who instigated the Hanoverian lobbying campaign, Count 
Münster or George III? Either way, we can see a Hanoverian faction successful in influencing 
a change in British policy for their own benefit; the question is how they did it. 
In March 1806, Prussia, having come to an agreement with France, occupied the 
Electorate of Hanover. This event serves as the epitome of British and Hanoverian national 
interests being in conflict, and so is crucial in understanding the constitutional nature of the 
dynastic union. To gain some insight into the British attitude towards Hanover we can look to 
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the correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh and George III a few months preceding the 
Prussian occupation. On the 11 January 1806, Viscount Castlereagh, serving in the 
Government as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, noted the risk to British troops 
stationed in Hanover due to the expectation of its loss to France or Prussia. In addition to his 
plans concerning an evacuation of British troops, Castlereagh suggested that the King give 
serious thought to allowing a temporary Prussian occupation to take place until peace was 
established.
120
 Castlereagh considered this course to be in both the King's and his Electoral 
subjects' best interests. He argued that a French occupation would likely see Hanover 
incorporated into Holland, and so grant France influence over the rivers Elbe and Weser, 
further insinuating that a Prussian occupation would be the lesser of two evils.
121
 This letter 
helps illustrate a British desire to retain good diplomatic relations with Prussia, whose 
Government, it was hoped, would eventually be convinced to abandon their shaky neutrality 
in the Allies favour; yet it goes further than that. It could be argued that, in his capacity as 
Secretary for War, Castlereagh was only doing his job in outlining Britain's tactical interest in 
an amicable Prussian occupation (over a hostile French one). Yet it is glaring that he did 
overstep his jurisdiction by offering advice on what was essentially a matter of Hanoverian 
policy under the guise of British strategic interest.  
The King's responses to Castlereagh further illustrates this point, while additionally 
expressing a mistrust on the King's part as to whether his British Government would respect 
the sovereignty of his Hanoverian subjects at the cost of Britain's strategic interests. After 
approving the plans to evacuate the British troops, and demanding the evacuation be extended 
to his Hanoverian soldiers as well, the King (via his Private Secretary) responded in great 
detail to Castlereagh's suggestions. George adamantly claimed that French occupation was 
                                                          
120
 A. Aspinall, The Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. IV, (London, 1968), 'no. 3168, Letters from 




44 | P a g e  
 
preferable to Prussian, claiming that 'the occupation of his Electoral dominions by an open 
enemy was preferable to their possession by a treacherous friend'.
122
 He further reasoned that 
by being aggressively occupied, the restitution of Hanover in the event of peace would be 
easier to obtain from a defeated France. This was opposed to having to negotiate control back 
from Prussia, had she obtained George's consent to occupy the state,
123
 George's belief being 
that the Prussians strongly desired Hanover for themselves and would not give up the 
Hanoverian territory easily. This first note, dated the 12 January, further reminded 
Castlereagh that the King expected his (British) Government never to secure peace without 
Hanover's recovery. This is possibly George III's diplomatic attempt to inform Castlereagh 
that Prussia was not to be handed Hanover, temporarily or otherwise, to secure British 
interests. In the above case Castlereagh's trespass into Hanoverian policy was somewhat 
overlooked, but following a further note on Castlereagh's part suggesting to bring the matter 
to Cabinet,
124
 he received a firm rebuke from the King, who reiterated his previous preference 
of a French occupation, and as he had firmly made up his mind he 'by no means calls on his 
British Ministers for an opinion on a subject which can alone be determined by what his 
Majesty feels he owes to himself and family.'.
125
 This correspondence is a prime example of 
when the British national interest was put on a collision course with the policy interests of 
Hanover, as laid down by her Elector. It further shows how the complexities of the personal 
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Relations between the Chancery and British Ministries 
It should be noted that the influence of Hanover on British politics was not always 
confrontational or at odds with British interests. Hanover's influence had positive side effects 
as well, although it is arguable that these were only felt as a result of individual statesmen's 
efforts to sustain and cultivate working relationships. To examine this point, we can turn to 
the correspondence between Count Münster and George Canning between the years 1807-
1809, the years that Canning held the post of Foreign Secretary. To add weight to the points 
that will be raised in this correspondence, the character and ambitions of George Canning 
must be examined, thus gaining an idea of the working relationship of the Foreign Secretary 
and Hanoverian Minister.  
George Canning is widely regarded by scholars as an ambitious individual, who held 
aspirations of being Prime Minister from an early stage of his political career. This view was 
also held by Canning's contemporaries. This ambition was complemented by Canning's 
ability to network and cultivate important social and political connections. For example, J. 
Steven Watson credited Canning as having been 'the darling of fashionable dinner parties'.
126
 
This should be noted, as the hosts of a social gathering of this kind would stand to boost their 
own prestige and status within their own circles if they were able to secure men who were 
viewed in such a manner. This can only have benefited Canning, who by cultivating this 
reputation would have been able to enhance his own standing amongst the British upper 
classes. This would have been important to him if he had eyes on the Premiership, as Watson 
claims the aristocracy did not truly see him as a gentleman as he was the son of an actress.
127
 
With such snobbery aimed against him, he would have needed to cultivate all the prestige he 
could, yet this would also have taught him the skills needed to develop political ties as well. 
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As he wanted to become Prime Minister, he would have needed two things: the support of his 
colleagues in Parliament, and the endorsement of the King. As Canning saw himself as Pitt's 
natural successor, he believed he was due the support of the Pittite MPs. He was also 
regarded as being intensely clever, and clearly seen as a man to watch, having been granted 
office at a comparatively young age in relation to the rest of the Cabinet, despite his open 
criticism of Cabinet colleagues he disagreed with.
128
 As such, gathering support for a 
government led by himself may have proved difficult in reality, but Canning clearly thought 
he was capable of the task. While the King's favour was not technically a necessity, the 
difficulty of a politician to advance quickly without it was evident from Charles Fox's career. 
This is where Count Münster would have been a useful ally to Canning, the German 
Chancery offices being based at the King's residence, St. James Palace.
129
 
Due to the competencies and character of Canning and Münster, their correspondence 
makes for interesting and insightful reading. Initially, Canning did not appear to have 
regarded Münster with anything other than a professional courtesy, the earlier letters from his 
time in office merely addressing the Count as Sir as opposed to addressing him by his title, 
and being somewhat rigid and brusk in manner. Additionally, when signing off a letter, 
Canning simply used the lines, 'Your obedient and humble servant', or an equally short 
equivalent.
130
 However by mid-1808 Canning addressed his letters with the salutation 'My 
dear Count', and ended them on the most part with a flattering extensive run of pleasantries, 
one such example being; 'Yours, my dear Count, with great regard and esteem, Your sincere 
and faithful, humble Servant, George Canning.'
131
 Ending letters in this manner reads as 
rather exaggerated in comparison to the more compact endings of his earlier correspondence. 
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On their own, these extensive subscriptions formally ending the letters do not explicitly 
signify an informal cordial relationship. What they do show, is that a mutual respect for the 
other's social and political standing had grown between the two men. As Anni Sairio and 
Minna Nevala discuss in their study of the social dimensions within letter writing, the more 
extensive and humbling the subscription at a letter's end, the more respect and social dignity 
is being expressed to the recipient.
132
 In the case of Canning and Münster, their later 
correspondence suggests a mutual respect for the rank of the other, and importantly, that 
neither signature style hints at a feeling of superiority or inferiority to the other. Due to Sairio 
and Nevala's findings, it is clear that a mutual respect grew between the two, who believed 
their positions to be equal in status, despite working for different polities. What proves the 
relationship was a cordial and affable one, and not just professional, is a later event 
surrounding the infamous Canning-Castlereagh duel. 
The additional evidence of a close relationship between Canning and Münster lies 
within Canning's last letter to Münster in his capacity as Foreign Secretary. The day before he 
resigned (as a consequence of the duel he had with Castlereagh the month before), Canning 
had taken the time to write to Münster, in which he expressed a desire to see him one last 
time before he resigned.
133
 The letter itself is quite short which, according to Sairio and 
Nevala, indicates informality,
134
 but the manner in which Canning asks this favour and the 
wording of the letter as a whole is quite touching, simply because when compared to letters 
from the start of their correspondence, the language used had softened dramatically and 
overall is less rigid and brusk compared to earlier letters. Now, whether or not a genuine 
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friendship developed on Canning's part is debatable, as this friendship could have been 
nurtured for political reasons. On the one hand, a genuine friendship may well have grown 
between the two men, as the above correspondence would imply. Yet Canning could have 
been using Münster to get a friend close to the King, and this should be considered. Indeed, 
by 1809 George III appeared to have had some level of trust in Canning's abilities, evidenced 
by his involvement in the affair to oust Castlereagh from office. Had Castlereagh had more 
favour with the King than Canning, it is unlikely that George, or even the Prime Minister, 
Portland, would have supported Canning's underhanded scheme.  
While the above is an example of how Canning may have used the existence of a 
Hanoverian Minister to promote his own political agenda, Münster was just as capable of 
cultivating a working relationship with Canning for his own ends. There is a series of letters 
in which Canning urged Münster to revoke his request for a passport for a Hanoverian 
gentleman who wanted to travel back to Hanover via Heligoland. Canning, on four separate 
occasions, one being verbal, attempted to persuade Münster that this would be a bad idea.
135
 
First of all, the weather for an Autumn/Winter crossing was treacherous, and should Canning 
have permitted this man a passport, he could not in good conscience deny other Hanoverians 
passports. He claimed that such an increase in activity would draw French attention, and 
would risk the closure of this route onto the Continent. This was of deep concern to Canning, 
as this route remained the only access point for news from the Continent at the time.
136
 He 
further argued that, should the French close this route of traffic, it would cause a scandal in 
Parliament that could damage Canning himself. However, despite these claims, and bearing 
in mind Canning's political aspirations, he stated that he would not stand in the way, and 
would permit passports should Münster insist upon them.
137
 This illustrates that, despite the 
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risk to British interests and Canning's own career, Münster had garnered enough support and 
influence with the Foreign Secretary that Canning was prepared to risk quite a lot for 
Hanoverian interests. The Canning-Münster relationship is of paramount importance when 
studying Anglo-Hanoverian relations. Primarily, it illustrates the cooperative nature of the 
two administrations, with political favours and influence fluidly moving across the divide. 
Furthermore, it provides ample proof that the two polities could voluntarily work together in 
a manner quite different to mere allies, yet not in such a way as would suggest the existence 
of a composite monarchy. The Canning-Münster relationship clearly highlights the flexible 
working nature of a personal union. 
While Harding’s argument for composite monarchy has merit, in that he recognises 
the failings of the current limits of the personal union thesis, it is this latter theory that 
remains the most adequate. Admittedly, our current understanding of what constitutes a 
personal union requires a less rigid definition. The personal union of Britain and Hanover 
was a complex political entity, and the relationship was viewed as such by contemporaries. If 
we allow for a personal union to be flexible, we see a more dynamic political entity emerge 
where precise jurisdiction was difficult to ascertain. One example can be found in a domestic 
affair between the King/Elector’s grooms, after they settled (temporarily) in Britain following 
their evacuation of the Hanoverian Electoral stables from the continent, while another is 
brought to light by examining the complexities of taxation.  In relation to taxes, the evidence 
will showcase that the rights of Hanoverians living in Britain was a continuous cause of 
complaint for Münster.  
Taxes, then as now, were not popular but necessary. What caused Münster concern 
was that these British taxes were being levied upon Hanoverians, the legality of which was 
contentious. It certainly brings to mind a not dissimilar disagreement between Britain and 
another party, of 'taxation without representation', that had ended quite badly for Westminster 
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some thirty years prior.
138
 The conception of income tax by William Pitt the Younger was a 
particular cause of contention for the British aristocracy, and although the cause for its 
creation was to fund the war effort, it has remained a staple of British revenue even now, 
despite regular repeals and reintroductions.
139
 Taxation has always had a presence in British 
history, whether this be as an influencing factor relating to the outbreak of the English Civil 
War,
140
 or the infamous rallying cry that led to George III’s loss of the American Colonies. 
However, these issues relate to the taxation of British subjects-colonists from a British 
authority. It is interesting to learn then, that the issue of taxation raises its head in the form of 
the taxation of Hanoverians by the British government. The importance of this cannot be 
understated; if Hanoverian subjects are being taxed by British authorities then it would 
suggest a closer union exists, one akin to that of Scotland and England, yet the political 
arguments of the British Government in relation to the Hanoverian union would deny them 
the right to tax these people. It is in this financial quagmire that we find Count Münster 
operating on behalf of Hanoverians in Britain. 
In a letter dated 15  January 1807, to the Foreign Secretary Viscount Howick (who 
would go on to be the Prime Minister Earl Grey in 1830), Count Münster raised the issue of a 
tax refund for a Mr. Best, who was serving as Hanoverian Secretary of Legation. Münster 
expressed that he had raised the issue with Howick’s predecessor, Charles Fox, but due to 
Fox’s passing nothing, understandably, had come of it.
141
 His letter, dated the 19
th
 January, is 
the one that shows Münster’s opinion on the matter of tax, and also the studious nature with 
which he approached it. He explained that Mr. Best was of dual nationality, his father being a 
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Hanoverian who had also held the role of Hanoverian Secretary of Legation. He pointed out 
that, although Best had been born in Britain, he had been residing in Hanover when he 
received the call to assume the Office of Legation in London. He expressed his belief that 
Best should, therefore, be exempt from taxation, this having been automatically deducted 
from him by the Bank.
142
  
To further emphasise this point, Münster enclosed a letter dated 13 December 1799, 
from Lord Grenville to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, in which Grenville had 
been encouraged by the King to express Mr. Best’s exemption from tax.
143
 While this letter 
stated that the exemption was due to the Office held by Best, and makes no mention of his 
nationality, it was Best's nationality that Münster pushed as his reason for tax exemption in 
the letter of 1807, adding that he ‘cannot entertain a doubt of his (Best) being entitled to the 
Exemptions claimed’.
144
  This shows us that, while Münster had a legal precedent from 1799 
with which to ensure Mr. Best's tax exemptions, he turned in addition to Best's rights as a 
Hanoverian national, suggesting that the Treasury had no rights on these grounds to tax 
Hanoverians. The issue of tax exemption is one that Münster returned to again and again 
throughout his time in office,
145
 suggesting that when it came to financial contributions, the 
British establishment was less particular in expressing a distinction between the two separate 
subjects than they were when it came to their foreign policy.  
This particular case study is noteworthy on two counts. In addition to the arguments 
on nationality put forward by Münster, we also find the King's belief that Best's diplomatic 
office should suffice as reason for exemption in the earlier case of 1799. If we take into 
account the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708, we see a strong legal case suggesting that Mr. 
Best should indeed have been in receipt of diplomatic immunity and the financial exemptions 
                                                          
142
 N.A., FO 34/1, 'Count Münster to Viscount Howick', 17 January 1807.  
143
 N.A., FO 34/1, 'Lord Grenville to Lords Commissioners of His Majesties Treasury', 13 December 1799. 
144
 N.A., FO 34/1, 'Count Münster to Viscount Howick', 17 January 1807. 
145
 See National Archives, FO 34/1, 'Treasury Chambers to George Hammond', 9 June 1809., as an example. 




 As the 1708 Act applied not just to ambassadors and public ministers 
of foreign courts, but also to their servants, both domestic and otherwise, Mr. Best's status 
seems without question.
147
 That British authorities repeatedly attempted to disregard the 1708 
Act, suggests that British Ministers held independent Hanoverian sovereignty in scant regard. 
This view can be reinforced further when noting that the 1708 Act specifically stated that any 
attempt to disregard its statutes should be considered criminal offences resulting in 'pains, 
penalties, and corporal punishment'.
148
 With the decrees of this Act, the King's own support, 
and Münster's points on nationality, we can only be left with one conclusion. That, from a 
British point of view, British-Hanoverian sovereignty had become indistinguishable from the 
personal union as Ministers could apply their own theories on where exactly their jurisdiction 
lay. From a Hanoverian perspective, we gain further evidence suggesting that Count Münster 
had to repeatedly make the case for full Hanoverian sovereignty, independent to the 
institutions of British politics. 
 Another example that illustrated Münster’s belief in the separate rights of 
Hanoverians can be found in a series of letters ranging from November to December, again in 
1807. The point of contention between the German Chancery and the British Government 
was whether two Hanoverian grooms should have been exempt from militia service. Count 
Münster's argument rested on the grounds that the two Hanoverians in question were residing 
in Britain only temporarily as refugees.
149
 While sounding of a trivial nature to begin with, 
the arguments put forward by the two departments quickly took on a legal and constitutional 
nature that questioned the nature of the personal union.  
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 On the British side the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, referred the matter to 
Lord Hutchinson, who with the assistance of the Attorney and Solicitor General, argued that 
as Hanoverians and British subjects alike shared the same sovereign, they should not be 
exempt from the responsibility to defend said sovereign by joining a militia.
150
 Count 
Münster’s response relied heavily on the separate nature of the two subject peoples. His 
argument rested primarily on three distinct points: the independent statehood of Hanover to 
Britain, the Alien Act of 1793, and the rights shown to foreigners of different nationality. He 
began his argument with expressed dismay that Canning had referred the matter to Lord 
Hutchinson, who in turn had not replied with the expected response. Judging from the 
forcefulness of Münster’s subsequent arguments, Hutchinson's response had not even been 
anticipated, such was the written display of Münster's disagreement. He claimed that, as 
Hanoverians, they were not subject to British laws.
151
 As the Government of Britain had 
frequently expressed their view on the separate nature of the two states, he insinuated that this 
distinction should have been obvious.  
 Münster's second point rested on the claim that as the two grooms were resident in 
Britain under ‘peculiar’ circumstances, having brought George III’s Hanoverian stables to 
Britain for safety, they should be treated according to the Alien Act.
152
 This Act essentially 
monitored European refugees, as well as any other foreigner the British authorities believed 
to be suspicious.
153
 While its initial purpose had been to allow the British government to 
monitor Émigrés from the Revolutionary war,
154
 its blanket coverage of anyone not born 
British clearly meant that (in Münster’s opinion) Hanoverian subjects qualified. He further 
claimed that as people covered by the Alien Act were not required to join organisations such 
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as a militia, the refugee grooms in question were exempt.
155
 Münster concluded with the fact 
that the Home Office would not expect a servant of a foreign dignitary or ‘another Prince’ to 
be pressed into a militia. As the grooms had taken the responsibility of rescuing the Elector’s 
property, they were working on behalf of George III in his Electoral capacity, thus ensuring 
they were servants of a separate sovereign.
156
 Again, Münster relied on George III’s own 
desire to retain a distinct separate identity to his own roles as Elector and King.  
 Interestingly, in a letter dated 12 May 1808, we discover it was the Home Secretary, 
Lord Hawkesbury, with the aid of constitutional lawyers, who prevailed. Hawkesbury argued 
that due to George III being Elector of Hanover the grooms owed allegiance to the King, as 
both sovereigns were housed in the same person.
157
 This was a point that Münster did not 
appear to agree with, and understandably so as it suggested a rather interesting legal 
assumption. If a Hanoverian subject of George III could be called to arms in the defence of 
Britain, due to the fact that the individual owed allegiance to the sovereign regardless of 
which titled moniker was in use, then the same principle in an equal personal union would 
imply that a British subject was required to take up arms in defence of Hanover. This went 
against the crucial point laid out in the Act of Settlement. As Count Münster appeared to have 
resigned himself to the fate of the two grooms, it is a safe assumption that he did not pursue 
the matter further as he did not wish to open this particular constitutional can of worms. What 
this does imply, however, is that the British establishment, while accepting the personal union 
as a reality, did not view it as a union of equals, a view clearly not shared by the Hanoverian 
Minister. 
 A second point to consider, in regards to the British position, was that Hanoverian 
service under the British flag was not entirely exclusive to the King's German Legion. 
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Hanoverians were not excluded from seeking promotion and advancement through other 
regiments of the British army.
158
 Jasper Heinzen explores Hanoverian military service in his 
work on the effects of transnational sentiment and its longevity, and in so doing, depicts a 
military community around the German Legion that enabled the Hanoverians to interact with, 
and become part of, the wider British military and the towns in which they were billeted.
159
 
While Heinzen goes on to explain convincingly how the myth of the Legion grew and in turn 
influence the memory of the union in British discourse, the evidence he supplies helps to 
explain the British position in regards to the case of the two grooms. With Hanoverian 
officers taking up posts in the wider British military, it is not unreasonable to presume that 
British authorities saw no issue of having the same rules apply to the rank and file. In this 
case a domestic militia. That the grooms were reluctant to enlist, and had the means to plead 
their case to the German Chancery probably did not factor into the initial decision. The forced 
enlistment of foreigners into British service was by no means unheard of, the most 
recognisable examples here being the Royal Navy press gangs. In spite of this, as the grooms 
had appealed to the Hanoverian Minister, we do see that this did become a constitutional 
issue, albeit an isolated one. This in itself furthers the argument that the union was pragmatic 
in nature, with constitutional and sovereign rights being dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
Overall, the above correspondence touches upon the very structure of the personal 
union, and its effect on the rights of its respective sovereign peoples. On the one hand, the 
British Government, while adamant that in political and foreign spheres the Hanoverians 
were not their concern, were prepared to overlook their official view somewhat when it came 
to domestic affairs. By promoting the joint sovereignty of the two realms, and taking 
advantage of the union's ambiguous nature, they hoped to acquire the right to tax resident 
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Hanoverians and press them into military service on the Home Front. The counterargument to 
this, as laid out repeatedly by the Hanoverian Minister, was that by Parliament's own 
admission the two states were separate, and by extension, so were their peoples. The rights 
shown to other foreigners should by default have been extended to the Hanoverians 
regardless of circumstance, the key point being that George III King of Britain was not their 
sovereign, it was George Elector of Hanover, and as such they were subjects of a foreign 
Prince. As the fate of the grooms was decided upon fairly ambiguous grounds, and evidence 
illustrates that Münster was repeatedly having to advocate for tax exemptions and rebates, it 
is suggestive that the nature of the personal union in regard to the rights of the House of 
Hanover’s subjects was never truly settled in this period, the union's very existence causing 
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Chapter 2: Smugglers, Spies, and Philanthropists  
 
The maritime relationship between Britain and Hanover during the Napoleonic war 
was one that had no immediate dividend for either side. It was more a case that British naval 
policy created the opportunity for both parties to benefit as a result of by-products of 
Britain’s policies. In the North and Baltic Seas, Napoleon’s Continental System provided the 
opportunity for Hanover to benefit through Britain’s defence of the smuggling operation that 
would grow out of Heligoland. The defence of these contraband routes in turn provided for a 
safe communication route to establish itself within the smuggling network, thus Count 
Münster could frequently pass on intelligence sent to him from his continental agents. This, 
for obvious reasons, was of additional benefit for Britain. After the Battle of Trafalgar in 
1805, and Napoleon diverting his northern forces to fight his wars in Germany, the threat of a 
military invasion of the British mainland diminished substantially. Napoleon had not given 
up in his attempt to subdue Britain; he had merely altered his strategy from one of military 
conquest to economic attrition.
160
 
To achieve the surrender of Britain, Napoleon attempted to introduce a continent-wide 
embargo of all British exports.
161
 On paper, the plan had merit as the British economy was 
highly invested in trade with the rest of Europe.
162
 Depriving Britain of the means to fund her 
allies, while dealing a blow to her industrialised economy, was a sound theoretical stratagem 
to force her to the negotiating table. In practice, however, the Continental System proved 
ineffective. To have any lasting effect on British trade, Napoleon would have had to ensure 
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his embargo was implemented across Europe, as the ports of France and her satellites alone 
would not have been enough to achieve the end intended.
163
 There is even logic in the 
argument, as put by Michael Broers, that the implementation of the Continental System was 
one of the driving forces behind Napoleon’s military campaigns across Europe; Portugal’s 
refusal in 1807 to implement Napoleon’s scheme brought French armies to the Iberian 
Peninsula, and events there would subsequently lead to war with Spain.
 164
 Enforcing the 
Russians to adhere to the System was an additional factor for the invasion of 1812.
165
 Yet by 
1808, Napoleon was in a position to close off many of the Mediterranean's ports to British 
shipping, despite British naval supremacy in that theatre. Indeed the dominance of the Royal 
Navy and their countering maritime blockade crippled southern Europe's trading hubs.
166
 
Napoleon was also able to close off the Baltic and Russian coastlines to the British. In 1806, 
as we have seen, Prussia was aligned briefly with the French through the transfer of Hanover. 
The cost of this was the closure of Prussian ports, a move that led to the brief war between 
Britain and Prussia, although, as has been discussed, the British demand for the return of 
Hanover to its Elector was an additional factor. The subsequent French war with Prussia the 
following year temporarily saw a return of British trade with the North of Germany but, 
following Prussian defeat and Russia’s peace settlement, as concluded in the Treaties of 
Tilsit, Napoleon had effectively cut British trade with the continent by early 1808.
167
 
Another example of the influence of the union during the war could be the efforts of 
prestigious Britons and Hanoverians in forming the 'Society of Friends of Foreigners in 
Distress'. Its founding in 1806 is noteworthy, being the same year as the Prussian occupation 
of Hanover. This philanthropist group’s aim was to provide funds for struggling foreigners, 
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and to help them return to their native lands when the opportunity arose.
168
 In its founding 
years, Count Münster was a notable patron.
169
 Whether he was a founding member remains to 
be seen, but the very existence of this society suggests that Hanoverian nationals had 
succeeded in exerting enough influence to gain support and sympathy from a portion of the 
British upper classes, thus bolstering Hanover's 'soft power'. Incidentally, the success of this 
Society speaks for itself, the Society being a registered charity in Britain that still functions 
today, 184 years after the union's dissolution.
170
 This is important to note, as it could be 
argued that, while originating as a body whose purpose generally aided Germans, it adapted 




While British and Royal policy traditionally appeared to want to keep British and 
Hanoverian interests as separate as possible, there was without doubt some overlap. This 
aspect can best be seen in diplomatic and espionage theatres. As the Napoleonic wars 
progressed, Britain found itself increasingly isolated, as more of the continent gave way to 
the arms of Napoleon, cutting Britain off from maritime commerce and military allies. This in 
turn saw a systematic removal of British delegates from the various courts of Europe, as 
either through choice or defeat, the other courts of the continent came under the sway of the 
French Empire. However, Hanoverian delegates remained in place, thus providing a channel 
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of communication between London and Europe that Napoleon appears to have 
uncharacteristically overlooked.  
Two key Hanoverians stand out on the diplomatic scene: Baron Ludwig von Ompteda 
in Prussia, whose more famous brother fought alongside Wellington in Spain but fell at 
Waterloo; and Count Hardenberg in Vienna, a distant cousin to the well-known Count 
Hardenburg in Prussian service.
171
 Webster briefly touched on this subject by noting that by 
1812 the British Foreign Office had ‘almost ceased to exist’ in regards to having agents in 
Europe, and that these two men were instrumental in keeping communications open at the 
height of Napoleon’s power.
172
 Unfortunately, while expressing the fact that these men acted 
openly and seemingly without repercussion, Webster did not delve into the questions he was 
raising, merely glossing over the issue as a curiosity of the period.
173
 What is more telling, 
however, is that many of the policy decisions Webster attributed to Castlereagh were, judging 
by his sources, built upon information Castlereagh could only have got from Count Münster 
or the Crown. Webster’s sources in this case were the various reports Ompteda and 
Hardenburg sent to Münster who, being the head of the German Chancery, did not answer to 
Parliament. While it is understandable for the two interested parties to pool resources, it begs 
the question as to whether Münster or Castlereagh had more influence on continental affairs; 
was Castlereagh Münster’s unwitting accomplice, or was Münster hoping for more concrete 
aid for Hanover to materialise from a grateful Britain? While the former is unlikely, Münster 
and the Hanoverian faction’s influence in the Foreign Office could be more substantial than 
previously acknowledged.  
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As already discussed, Hanoverian influence within the Foreign Office is covered to a 
degree by Simms, who used the events of 1806 as his example.
174
 The diplomatic 
correspondence between Münster and his agents after 1806 does much to build on Simms’s 
seminal article in this regard. To demonstrate further that the Hanoverian agents were 
instrumental in forming British policy, would be that they were trusted far more than their 
British counterparts. Hardenburg, for example, enjoyed the confidence of Count Metternich 
of Austria,
175
 and was thus able to glean a great deal of insight into the plans of this highly 
secretive minister. The level of influence on the part of Hanover is further illustrated by 
Webster’s claim that it is only due to Ompteda’s intervention in 1813 that Britain agreed to 
an alliance with Prussia, on the promise of returning the Kingdom to its size in 1806, and not 
that of 1805; the Prussian Minister Hardenburg had almost succeeded in having the British 
accept the 1805 agreement when Prussia had considerably more territory.
176
 This 
subsequently calls into question the competence of the British delegates in this particular 
case. 
With his views on Prussia having already been established, we can turn to the full 
impact of Count Münster on Britain’s foreign policy. With the loss of Hanover in 1803, 
Count Münster was essentially head (after the King/Elector) of a Government in exile, almost 
a Charles de Gaulle of the nineteenth century. The influence this position granted him, in 
addition to his close proximity and relationship with the Sovereign, was not lost on agents in 
Europe. In his diplomatic correspondence we see that it was not just Hanoverian agents that 
kept him informed of affairs, but also statesmen and military officers from other European 
courts, notably those of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns. More often than not in the case of 
the latter, this was to request his assistance in facilitating British support for military 
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ventures, or even just financial aid. This is important to note, as it would suggest that, while 
being the representative of a nation that had essentially ceased to exist, Münster was still held 
as an important and influential figure by people outside of the British-Hanoverian political 
arena. Whether this trust in his influence was based on a poor understanding of the political 
reality of the Anglo-Hanoverian union, or a strong faith in Münster’s personal capabilities as 
an individual, will probably never be truly understood, but occasionally we can discover 
glimpses of how the union was perceived by external nations. It is even arguable that it was 
the perception of Münster’s influence that allowed him to become such an influential figure 
within British foreign policy. Due to the nature of information sent to him by both his own 
agents and foreign dignitaries, Münster was able to cultivate what would nowadays be 
described as an intelligence network and make it available to the British authorities. A 
network that they themselves would have found hard to match, as it was presumably much 
easier to explain away the presence of a Hanoverian in central Europe than a Briton. By 
examining his diplomatic correspondence we will see how Münster sustained his personal 
influence and made himself indispensable to the Foreign Office, suggesting that the union 
paid out profitable dividends in the realms of foreign policy and diplomatic espionage, while 
incidentally proving to be beneficial to Britain’s prospective allies. 
In a letter from Berlin dated September 1811, Prussia and Austria were 
communicating unofficially through the conduit of the Hanoverian agents.
177
 The information 
they passed to each other in turn got passed on to the Foreign Secretary the following 
month,
178
 as Count Münster made it a habit to translate and convey a large quantity of these 
documents to the Foreign Office.
179
 On the 10
th
 September, Baron Ompteda wrote of a plan 
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of military action on the part of Prussia, and he sent the despatches with his brother, Colonel 
Ompteda.
180
 The Colonel had a verbal report to give of a secret conversation he had had with 
Colonel Gneisenau, to supplement the Baron’s communique. Baron Ompteda expressed that, 
at that time, it was impolitic for Prussia to be seen communicating with Austria, so the two 
states had turned to using Münster’s agents as intermediaries. Ompteda would send Prussian 
information to Count Hardenburg in Vienna, with instruction to forward them in turn to 
Count Metternich.
181
 Britain profited from this informal agreement, as both Ompteda and 
Hardenburg relayed this information to Münster, who then translated and informed the 
Foreign Secretary, Marquess Wellesley, of events.
182
 Had the Guelphic union not been in 
existence, it is questionable how much of this information would have found its way to 
Britain, thus further showing the importance of the union and the Hanoverians.  
The same series of despatches provides further evidence of the value of the 
Hanoverian connection with the continent. Colonel Ompteda, on arriving in Britain, provided 
Count Münster with an extensive military analysis of Prussia, alongside strategic ideas put to 
him by Colonel Gneisenau. Gneisenau proposed a strategy similar to the guerrilla warfare 
being carried out in Spain and pressed for British aid in the form of arms and ammunition.
183
 
The support of the Royal Navy present in the Baltic was then later requested in conjunction 
with these plans by a Colonel Dornberg.
184
 Before agreeing to petition Britain on behalf of 
Prussia, Col. Ompteda succeeded in gaining a thorough report on the strength of existing 
Prussian forces, the projected number of men Gneisenau believed he could raise, which forts 
were planned to be used as bases, and which forts were unsuitable due to French 
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 He further discovered Gneisenau’s plans should he suffer defeats, his plan 
being to essentially drop the notion of pitched battles and instead to fight a guerrilla war in 
the four administrative regions left to the Prussian state. If one fell, the remaining three would 
continue the struggle. Gneisenau is reported to state that should Prussia fall, he would see her 
fall with honour to the end, insinuating that the defeat of 1807 was anything but. It is due to 
Ompteda’s bargaining in this matter that Münster was able to supply the Foreign Office not 
just with Prussia’s request for assistance, but also a detailed layout of Prussian capabilities, 
thus allowing Britain to make a well-informed decision. Evidence of this process is further 
supplied in a separate despatch that suggested a plan to secure and form an independent state 
of Italy and Illyria which, in concert to an invasion in the north of Germany, could have 
opened up the whole of Central Europe as another front.
186
 It appears that however outlandish 
the scheme suggested, Münster did not take it upon himself to limit the decisions that the 
Foreign Secretary could propose to his government by censoring his intelligence, no matter 
the quality of the strategies sent him.  
 The passing on of important continental despatches was not the only purpose Münster 
served when it came to foreign policy. He used information learnt to press for action in 
relation to his Hanoverian homeland. There are two examples highlighting this, one being his 
involvement in lobbying for support of a reported Hanoverian uprising in 1809, and another 
relating to events in Hanoverian territories that were to be incorporated into the Kingdom of 
Westphalia in 1810. Addressing the former issue first, we find through letters and political 
statements that Münster and the Elector were both being kept well-informed of events in 
Hanover, and when things came to a head in May 1809, George instructed Münster to begin 
lobbying Parliament for action. In a communique to the Foreign Secretary, Münster informed 
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Canning of the Elector's instruction, and that he had received reports of a general uprising in 
Hanover that had resulted in the attack of Dutch troops that consequently led to that force 
having to formally lay down their arms.
187
 Münster went on to state that a provisional 
government had been set up, and that it was his duty to plea on behalf of the provisional 
government and his sovereign for British aid. He further insisted, that with British support, 
Münster could raise a substantial number of troops in a short space of time.
188
 This particular 
belief in Münster’s recruitment capabilities was later echoed in Gneisenau’s plan for a wider 
German uprising in 1811, where he stated that Münster’s presence in Hanover would cause 
men to flock to him should he wish to lead them into battle in the Prince Regent's name.
189
 As 
there were three public proclamations from the provisional government in Münster’s 
possession by July 1809,
190
 it seems, on the face of it, that the uprising at this stage had had 




Yet by late August of the same year the situation had changed. In what appears to be a 
letter to the British Government, Count Münster acknowledged a ‘change in circumstances’ 
relating to the events in Hanover, but still pressed for military action.
192
 He suggested an 
expedition could still be successful in the north of Germany if plans were modified 
accordingly. Münster noted he had been instructed by the King to press for such an 
expedition to take place, in the event of the termination of the Walcheren campaign,
193
 and 
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that he had received similar requests from Vienna and ‘some Prussian Officers’.
194
 While this 
implies that a general German uprising could have been in the making, Münster cautioned 
against a strategy that relied heavily upon the Austrians. He went on to state, as 
diplomatically as possible, that in his opinion an expedition under existing plans would be 
unwise. He called into question the sincerity of Austrian support, and the wisdom of investing 
more British troops in Holland should Austria fail to aid the British. He stressed that the 
troops in Holland would have to face off against a large force headed by Marshal Bernadotte, 
who was known to be in the vicinity of Antwerp, and that such an encounter would isolate 
British troops and make an insurrection in Holland insecure.
195
  
Münster did however suggest an alternative strategy, which coincidentally could 
prove beneficial to Hanover. He suggested that a small diversionary force could remain in 
Flanders, thus tying up the French troops in Holland, while the rest of the force could be sent 
to Hanover, using Cuxhaven as a beachhead. He acknowledged that the troops sent to this 
location would likely have had to face an estimated 22,000 men consisting of Westphalians, 
Danes, and Saxons, but their forces would not have been consolidated and would in turn have 
to deal with uprisings.
196
 Münster further supported his argument by claiming the Prussians 
had promised to cross the Elbe should Britain invest its troops in Hanover and secure an 
insurrection.
197
 Münster ended his plea for a revised strategy by stating that, with British 
support, a legitimate authority could be restored in the city of Hannover, allowing for further 
military operations in northern Germany. This could then have acted as a central point of 
communications in a central European front, with local intelligence of ideal places to capture 
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and fortify, thus securing the region long enough to analyse whether the insurrection had the 
ability to support itself.
198
  
These documents illustrate that Münster, while being passionate for the liberation of 
his homeland, did not simply ask for a blank cheque, but offered his own local knowledge 
and analysis of foreign promises to advise the British should they consider aiding the 
Hanoverians. It is crucial to note that although he does refer to his instruction from the King 
on this matter, he not once demanded the assistance of Britain, merely requested it. In short, 
he refrained from calling on the shared sovereign ties of the two nations, respecting the 
intentions of the Act of Settlement as laid out by Parliament. He was passionate in his 
requests for aid, but this is to be expected, his homeland having by this point been under 
foreign occupation for six years. The absence of any mention of their shared allegiance was 
not once used as a means of persuasion. This is not to say that the influence of the union was 
obsolete in this matter, far from it. When Prussians or Austrians appealed for help, they had 
few points of contact with which to lobby, namely the Hanoverian Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary. Münster, due to the union and his presence in London, was able to appeal directly 
to Parliament, using the ties created by the union to promote his cause regardless of the 
outcome. 
A crucial element of the occupation of Hanover would be Napoleon's eventual 
decision to annex part of its territory into the newly formed Kingdom of Westphalia. This 
event resulted in further dialogue between the German Chancery and the Foreign Office on 
matters Hanoverian. In a letter sent in May 1810, Münster announced to Wellesley that as a 
result of the unrest in Hanover in 1809, Bonaparte had deemed it necessary to cede the bulk 
of Hanover into a system that would make it easier to control.
199
 By reverting control of 
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Hanover to France and Westphalia, Münster expressed a concern that Napoleon has proved 
that, whatever the outcome of the war, the return of Hanover to George III was no longer on 
the table.
200
 He reminded the Foreign Secretary of Britain’s earlier pledges of ensuring that 
this remained a condition for peace, citing a brief account of Hanover’s fate since 1803 and 
Britain’s firm stance on this issue. He further reminded the Foreign Secretary that the 
invasions of Hanover were justified by France (as Prussia had in 1806) as being in response 
to British policy. This, in Münster’s (and the King’s/Elector's) mind, made the various 
invasions illegal. As each invasion had been met by a stern proclamation from Parliament 
that guaranteed their sovereign's ancestral rights to Hanover, he stressed that the 
circumstances they found themselves in, in 1810, deserved another proclamation from the 
British government.
201
 Proclamation forthcoming or not, however, this was not the end of the 
Westphalian matter.  
The following August, Wellesley received another despatch from Münster concerning 
the property of Hanoverians serving in the King’s German Legion. Unless they returned to 
said property in Westphalia, the land would be confiscated by the imposed King, Jerome 
Bonaparte. Münster argued that the value of this property should be guaranteed by the British 
government and returned to them when peace was established, but failing that, confiscation 
of property should be reciprocated in kind.
202
 This issue is further pressed on the Foreign 
Secretary by direct royal intervention. The Duke of Cambridge, who was a Colonel in the 
K.G.L, claimed that the lucrative colonial property then occupied by British forces should be 
confiscated and, it was implied, that this property would be used as compensation to the 
Hanoverians who were set to lose property in Westphalia.
203
 In this instance, we see that the 
existence of the union was bringing financial and moral obligations to Britain; obligations 
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that, had the union not existed, Britain would not have had to contend with. Additionally, the 
Foreign Secretary was having to decide upon an issue that could affect future peace 
negotiations as a result of pressure not merely from a fellow Minister of his Sovereign, but by 
pressure coming from the Sovereign’s own family.  
Count Münster’s involvement in foreign affairs primarily rested on his instrumental 
assistance in keeping the United Kingdom informed, often in great detail, of events in central 
Europe; this information having been gathered through Hanoverian agents who could explain 
their presence much easier than their British counter parts. However, he was not merely a 
glorified messenger boy for the Foreign Office. Due to his political capacity, he could impose 
pressure in a manner that a simple emissary could not and, when needed, could express the 
direct interest of the King in any given situation. His advice and knowledge of Hanoverian 
events, and his opinions on the Central Powers capabilities would also have aided Britain in 
making informed choices when it came to devising military stratagems. Yet throughout his 
time in office, despite aiding the British Foreign Office in gathering intelligence, Münster did 
not lose sight of the fact that he was a Hanoverian representative.  
When the opportunity presented itself, the Count pushed for military assistance in the 
hope of liberating his homeland. He may have had a closer proximity to British politicians 
than the representatives of other European courts working in his favour, but this was a direct 
result of the existence of the union between Hanover and Britain, and so it is evident that, in 
regards to foreign affairs, both states benefited from the union. Britain received detailed 
reports with well-informed advice to accompany it, while Hanover enjoyed an indisputable 
guarantee that its independence would be returned once peace was accomplished. In addition, 
Hanover enjoyed something that Prussia and Austria did not. Münster’s close relationship 
with the Foreign Office in turn made him privy to the plans of British strategists, and so 
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enabled him to make detailed assessments on how plans could be altered slightly to increase 
the chance of aiding his own country. 
 
Heligoland 
On paper, Napoleon’s immediate success of implementing the Continental System 
seems evident. The war with Portugal in 1807 appeared to be going well for France in the 
sense that Marshall Junot had seized control of Lisbon despite his losses to attrition,
204
 and 
the rest of Europe, including Russia, was adhering to the system. The Russians themselves 
forcing their Swedish neighbours to join the enterprise through military means in 1809
205
 The 
reality, however, was quite different. The war in Portugal would become the opening act of 
the Peninsular War, a disastrous military venture that would infamously be known for 
centuries as Napoleon’s ‘Spanish Ulcer’. On the eastern border of Napoleon’s empire, the 
Russians steadily gave up any pretence of enforcing the embargo on British trade by using 
neutral shipping as a conduit.
206
 In the rest of Europe, the popularity of British goods and the 
reliance of economies both on the continent and in Britain meant that a roaring trade in 
smuggled goods spread across Europe’s northern coastlines.
207
 Crucial to the success of the 
smugglers was the naval base of Heligoland captured from the Danish in 1807. James Davey 
sums up the importance of Heligoland in this capacity by referring to the island as ‘the 
Warehouse of Europe’.
208
 Merchants carrying British goods would sell their cargoes at 
Heligoland and then smugglers, often falsely flying neutral colours, would carry the goods on 
to the European coastline, regularly in convoy under the protection of the Royal Navy. The 
wealth that this trade offered to merchants was so lucrative that Davey gives evidence that 
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officials could easily be bribed, asking rhetorically why a French administrator would give up 
a bribe worth a year’s wages for pretending to be asleep for half an hour.
209
 Such easy money 
would hardly have been passed up. Yet despite the wide scale corruption of men tasked with 
implementing the system (and the blasé attitudes of some sovereigns), the smuggling 
operation was not without risk. The Danish, for example, after having lost their fleet to the 
British in a not-so-diplomatic pre-emptive naval strike, adopted a maritime stratagem of 
raiding the trade convoys with gunboats as they passed through the Danish straits. While not 
being enough to close off the Baltic to the smugglers, this could be evidence to explain why 
the Hanoverian port of Cuxhaven is listed by Noel Mostert as being one of the three main 
entry ports on the continent used by the smugglers.
210
  
 The importance of Cuxhaven, and Hanoverian access to the smuggling operation, 
granted more than just economic benefits to Britain and Hanover. As has been discussed 
previously, the Hanoverian Minister in London supplied the Foreign Office with a steady 
stream of intelligence acquired by his agents across Europe. The established smuggling 
routes from Hanover and Prussia (guarded in convoy by the Royal Navy) granted a safer 
route of transit for those agents than their counterparts working in France presumably would 
have had access to. The agents would merely board a ‘neutral’ ship that would stop at either 
Heligoland or an alternative naval base situated outside Gothenburg in Sweden. That these 
bases were not just depots for merchants, but an essential stopping point for those carrying 
letters from Hanoverian agents, is indicated in various despatches between Münster and the 
Foreign Office. For example, in a letter dated May 12
th
 1808, Münster asked for passports so 
that Officers of the King’s German Legion (K.G.L.) to return to Hanover. In this letter, he 
stated that the officers would be travelling via Heligoland, specifying that they would only 
require British passports to carry them as far as the island, with Heligoland acting as the 
                                                          
209
 Ibid., p. 241. 
210
 Noel Mostert, ‘The Line Upon a Wind, The Great War at Sea 1793-1815’, (New York, 2008), p. 525. 
72 | P a g e  
 
transfer link in their commute.
211
 That the same journey was carried out in reverse is 
indicated in a separate letter dated November 5
th
 1811, the contents of which detail the 
complexities of the necessary communication routes, but in this instance the alternative 
British base outside Gothenburg was used as the transfer link.
212
 The less-than-subtle 
defiance of Napoleon’s clients and allies, in regards to the continental system, could well be 
an indirect factor that contributed to Count Münster’s ability to act as the head of a 
Hanoverian intelligence network that aided Britain. The ease with which his agents could 
communicate with him would doubtless have been substantially harder had the smuggling 
ring not existed. The benefits that the smugglers provided for the communication of 
intelligence could lead to the question of whether the Royal Navy protected the smugglers for 
the reason of intelligence, but this is doubtful. While Britain would have benefited indirectly 
from ensuring a safer means for Münster’s communications, the priority for a nation so 
heavily invested in trade would have made the protection of the smuggling routes a major 
strategic concern; that this protection would in turn provide further security for Münster’s 
informants could well be no more than happy coincidence. The British attitudes towards 
Hanoverians in the North Sea, and their reliability as loyal agents of the Crown, can be 
examined in the detailed letters written by the Foreign Office agent in Heligoland, Edward 
Nicholas. 
Stationed in Heligoland from the beginning of February 1808, Edward Nicholas was 
charged by George Canning to review all correspondence leaving and arriving at the island, 
with the exception of those sent by the few British servants of the Crown resident in 
Heligoland.
213
 His apparent capability and sense of duty in carrying out this task leads one to 
view Nicholas as the gatekeeper to the British spying community on the continent. While 
                                                          
211
 N.A., FO 34/1, ‘Count Münster to George Canning’, 12 May 1808. 
212
 N.A., FO 34/3, ‘Colonel Ompteda to Count Münster’, 5 November 1811. 
213
 N.A., FO 36/1, 'Edward Nicholas to George Canning', 7 February 1808. 
73 | P a g e  
 
stationed on the island, Nicholas additionally kept the British authorities abreast of events on 
the continent, using information gathered from his own circle of agents throughout Hanover 
and the Hanse towns. Nicholas’s reports back to the British mainland illuminate the 
importance that the British naval presence in the North Sea provided for Hanover, and 
simultaneously provide a window into the British perception of the Hanoverian agents. One 
benefit of the naval presence, which becomes immediately apparent within his reports, was 
the desired relationship between the British fleet and the fishing communities of the 
European coastline. Within ten days of his arrival on the island, Nicholas reported to George 
Canning that Danish and German fishing communities were tied intricately to one another, 
and to the people of Heligoland. He expressly mentioned Cuxhaven (one of three examples) 
as being one such community that took part in this localised international market.
214
 Since the 
British occupation of Heligoland in 1807, the Heligolanders had been unable to fish safely in 
the region alongside the Danish and the French-occupied Germans. Nicholas suggested that 
mutual fishing arrangements with the local authorities could be negotiated successfully, and 
that such an agreement would be hugely beneficial to His Britannic Majesty. The main 
benefit forecasted by Nicholas was that the cost of sustaining Heligoland would become 
redundant, but he added subversively that communication between the Heligolander 




Nicholas’s efforts in the realm of espionage proved to be highly successful throughout 
1808. By establishing connections with North Sea merchants, he was able to gather vital 
information that could have influenced the British Government’s decision to safeguard the 
aforementioned smuggling operation. His reports included, for example, the rapid rise in cost 
of colonial produce. After being informed that coffee had tripled in price, Nicholas stated that 
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he immediately made efforts with the informing merchant to open up communication on this 
matter, the implication being the acquisition of his assistance in furthering Britain’s 
smuggling interests.
216
 Nicholas’s success in safeguarding Britain’s illicit trade was indicated 
in a letter several months after his appointment, where he described what was essentially a 
booming black market.
217
 Chiefly, but not exclusively, through his merchant connections 
Nicholas was able to garner a large variety of information relating to continental affairs. This 
ranged from forced loans in French occupied territories, to troop movement and fortifications, 
the latter providing evidence for a French invasion of Denmark and the redeployment of 
troops to Iberia.
218
 By December 1808, he had acquired enough information to produce a 
ledger that detailed the regional partition of Hanover amongst Napoleon's Marshals, with the 
added forecast of the estimated revenue that each Marshal would extort from his delegated 
territory.
219 The accomplishments of Nicholas, in terms of espionage, were of benefit to 
Britain. Yet the means by which his suggestions were put into practice provided marked 
improvements for the people of Hanover and the larger coastal communities of the North Sea. 
The interest placed on safeguarding the pre-existing fishing community, while for British 
interest, is self-evident in the way such a measure would aid the local fishing industries of 
their respective communities. Yet the reports are not only useful in indicating British attempts 
at espionage, but also provide an opportunity to gauge British attitudes of the Hanoverian as 
an independent agent. 
As has been mentioned, Count Münster made several requests for passports for 
Hanoverians to travel to the continent via Heligoland. The frustrations that his endeavours 
encountered appear to have come, in part, from the views expressed by Mr. Nicholas. In a 
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particularly detailed letter to the Foreign Office, Nicholas expressed his views on ‘the 
alien’.
220
 It was Nicholas’s view that subjects of His Britannic Majesty should be readily 
permitted to reside in, and correspond with the continent from, Heligoland. The presumption 
here being that so long as the correspondence was watched with care (to guard against 
‘imprudence’
221
), such people were naturally trustworthy individuals. However, the ‘alien’, 
he suggested, was not to be permitted such opportunities. The only exception was if such 
foreign individuals were ‘recommended by well known Characters…[that] have the same 




While the bulk of the letter examined the dangers posed by the passage of Danish 
merchants who had had their ships confiscated,
223
 his suggestions concerning Hanoverians 
reflected the views that had been held since the personal union came into being.
224
 While 
acknowledging that the Hanoverians should be granted more leeway than peoples not subject 
to the House of Guelph, it is clear that Nicholas retained reservations concerning their 
loyalties to the ‘British’ cause. This is indicated by the fact that Hanoverians, despite being 
required to be accompanied by reputable references, were in Nicholas’s opinion worthy of 
extra surveillance or 'greatest precaution',
225
 on the grounds that they were not British. Such 
discrimination, however, was not unfounded, in the sense that it was the logical conclusion of 
the preconceptions held in Britain regarding the dangers that a personal union with Hanover 
posed. The irregular fears that had been brewing ever since the accession of George I, that 
Hanover as an Electoral state could prove to be detrimental to British institutions and values, 
naturally evolved into a distrust of the Hanoverian. Further indicators of this can be seen in 
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the frequent public hyperbole that surrounded the K.G.L. after their arrival in Britain.
226
 That 
such views had progressed to the extent that Edward Nicholas believed that Hanoverians 
wanting to communicate with, or even travel to, Hanover required meticulous observation is 
unsurprising, and explains why in spite of Münster’s repeated efforts, the number of 
Chancery-approved Hanoverians travelling to Heligoland from Britain was radically smaller 




The Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress 
By examining the actions of the 'Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress', one can 
gain some insight into how British society viewed the personal union and its subject peoples. 
Founded in 1806, this philanthropic group sought to provide funds for struggling foreigners, 
and to help them return to their native lands at the earliest opportunity.
228
 This proved to be 
beneficial for Hanoverians, and the Society later had the honour of counting amongst its 
patrons most of the Royal Houses of Europe, as well as prestigious diplomats from across the 
world.
229
 Count Münster, who attended regularly the charity’s annual reception dinner,
230
 by 
1815 was its Vice-President.
231
 The importance of this charity in discerning the constitutional 
nature of the dynastic union should not be understated due to its excellent portrayal of 
Hanoverian 'soft power'. The charity made clear that it was not its responsibility (or aim) to 
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aid subjects of the British crown, whether they were British or colonial. As they aided 
Hanoverians, such a sentiment suggests that the British upper classes (and clergy) did not 
view the connection with Hanover as anything other than a personal union. That Hanoverians 
were aided was naturally beneficial for the Hanoverian Minister. However, as Münster had 
gained a position within the Society itself, the question remains as to whether this was a 
calculated attempt on his part to win over the 'hearts and minds' of British society and thus 
indirectly bolster Hanoverian 'soft power' reserves through the Society's social interactions. 
The aid Hanoverians received can be seen in a case preceding 1815, when the charity 
rescued a Hanoverian widow of a British Sergeant. Following the death of her husband, the 
woman (with infant in tow) had tried to gain passage to Gothenburg, where she had a sister. 
Unfortunately, she appeared to have struggled with the English language, and had resorted to 
selling most of her possessions before the charity became aware of her situation. The Society 
furnished her with funds, and secured her and her child passage aboard a Swedish vessel.
232
 
In addition, the charity noted a separate case whereby it aided a man intent on joining the 
King’s German Legion. Again, this fell within their remit of assisting people who were not 
subjects of His Britannic Majesty. The man in question made several attempts to reach Spain 
and enlist during the peninsular campaign. He attempted to avoid detection by travelling via 
Turkey, but failed to secure passage from Smyrna, instead taking a vessel to London due to ill 
health. It was while recovering in a workhouse in Whitechapel that the charity became aware 




The charity’s efforts in assisting the foreign Hanoverians is further evidence of 
contemporaries viewing the dynastic union as a personal union, in as much as the 
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Hanoverians were not considered ‘British’ subjects, thus showing the extent to which the 
personal union thesis had penetrated society.
234
 That Münster could assist his fellow 
countrymen from a social position, while simultaneously cultivating his and his homeland's 
standing in British society, is evidence of Hanoverian soft power at work. Indeed, the 
question of whether Münster had such an agenda is not implausible. As G. M. Ditchfield 
points out, the occupations of Hanover received little public interest and any overtly 
noticeable British political outrage was short-lived.
235
 It is possible then, that Münster was 
attempting to ingratiate himself with British socialites, which in turn could produce more 
public sympathy and political pressure for his cause. The extent to which Hanoverians could 
influence British decision-making from a societal footing is a viable and interesting research 
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Chapter 3: Debt, Peace, and Pensions  
 
Following its liberation in 1814, Hanover rapidly re-emerged on the international 
stage as an independent country, distinctly separate from the United Kingdom. For the first 
time in just over a decade, Hanoverian policies concerning Hanover were being implemented 
in the former Electorate, not in London. Having been Minister of the German Chancery in 
London throughout the war, Count Münster had come to embody a Hanoverian government 
in exile. It would be expected then, that the man would have received some relief in his 
workload once administrative bodies in Hanover were resurrected. Yet this was not the case. 
While being in a position where some responsibilities could now be delegated to ministers 
and civil servants in his homeland, Count Münster received fresh duties, namely to represent 
Hanover throughout the Congress of Vienna. As the personal union allowed for a coordinated 
effort on the part of the British and Hanoverian plenipotentiaries, Münster was placed in a 
position where he would directly affect the negotiations, independent from Britain. The task 
given him, and the subsequent consequences, would go on to have a longer-lasting impact on 
Hanover than the preceding years of occupation. Indeed, it could be argued that the decisions 
that Münster was directly involved in would shape the geo-political map of Europe and 
dominate inter-European relations for the next century.  
High-stakes international diplomacy was not the only sphere within which the Anglo-
Hanoverian union pursued a coordinated course of action. Financial matters, chiefly 
concerning Sweden, but including Hanse towns such as Hamburg, were also resolved in a 
more cooperative manner than one would expect, given the poor track record of the 
eighteenth century in making peace.
236
 Indeed, the fiscal policies pursued in this matter 
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display the strengths of the personal union as a political entity, even when the interests of the 
constituent parts were not always aligned. Additional factors to be considered are Britain’s 
economic and naval policies in the Mediterranean, chiefly concerning the Barbary States. 
These would have beneficial consequences for Hanover at the expense of Britain’s own 
economic interests in the area, and were unforeseen on Britain’s part. What this meant for the 
Anglo-Hanoverian union is particularly illuminating. The war itself, naturally, left an impact 
upon the Hanoverians who had lived through it. Even years after the peace, the conjoined war 
effort of the Anglo-Hanoverian union could still be seen. Veterans of the King’s German 
Legion, far from being funded by the Hanoverian government, instead received their pensions 
direct from the Chelsea Hospital fund in Britain. This peculiar development, highlights not 
only the impact of the personal union at a social level, but also illustrates the longevity of 
Anglo-Hanoverian policies and how these obligations were upheld.  
 
The Settling of Subsidies 
The diplomatic efforts of Münster and Castlereagh between 1814 and 1815 is a strong 
indicator of robust cooperation between the respective representatives of the Guelphic lands. 
Despite occasional altercations, efforts were made on both sides to achieve a positive 
outcome. Yet to say that this level of harmony spilled over into the diplomatic spectrum is 
dubious. Contentious matters did indeed exist and negotiations were necessary. 
Unsurprisingly the controversial issues in question involved money and stemmed from the 
British wartime policy of subsidies. However, compromise was invariably reached, showing 
that even over matters as provocative as foreign debt, the Anglo-Hanoverian union was able 
to find practical solutions, in part because of its supple constitutional modus operandi. Three 
separate case studies emphasise this point: 1. The subsidies owed to the Hansa towns, 2. The 
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Hanoverian claims on the defunct Dutch subsidy, and 3. The Swedish debt to Hanover. The 
first of these case studies was arguably the most controversial. It revolved around the 
subsidies owed to the Hansa towns, chiefly Hamburg, the financing of which was disputed 
between Britain and Hanover. A thorough report by the Duke of Cambridge to Earl Bathurst 
provides a rich analysis of the dispute.  
During the liberation of Northern Germany, there had been a proclamation made by 
General Settenborn calling upon the peoples of Northern Germany to rise against the French. 
The Hanseatic Legion was formed in response to this call to arms. Unfortunately for the 
people of Hamburg, French forces soon retook the city. The Hanseatic Legion, however, 
continued to operate. In a manner not dissimilar to the King’s German Legion, the Hanseatic 
Legion, following a convention with General Sir Charles Stewart, placed itself under British 
command and pay. The Duke of Cambridge stressed that under Article 4 of that convention, 
the Legion would be able to re-enter the service of Hamburg once the city had been retaken 
from the French, with the option of returning to British service should the British government 
approve. By June 1814, Lübeck and Hamburg had resumed command over the Hanseatic 
Legion, and a letter between that Legion's former commander, General Decken, and the 
Senates of those cities stated that from 1
st
 July 1814, they would no longer be in British pay. 
This, in the Duke of Cambridge’s view, was the end of Britain’s obligations to the Hanseatic 
Legion, in relation to General Stewart’s convention.
237
  
 The problem that arose was the subsequent call to arms following the conclusion of 
the Peace of Paris. The Duke of Cambridge informed Bathurst that, following the Allied 
Sovereigns' disposition to retain some forces in the north of Germany, Count Münster was 
tasked with relaying that wish to the Dukes of Brunswick and Mecklenburg, and the Senates 
of the Hansa towns. Hamburg (and Lübeck) agreed to raise men but claimed financial 
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assistance in the form of subsidies would be required.
238
 Their request to the British 
government on this went unanswered until Viscount Castlereagh promised as much financial 
aid as was necessary for the upkeep of the Hanseatic Legion. Furthermore, Cambridge 
pointed out that a letter he received from the Senate of Hamburg stated that they had 
considered the Legion to be under the continued service of the Prince Regent. It is curious to 
note that, following his lengthy argument with which Cambridge stated Hanover had no 
obligation to Hamburg, he offered to press the Hanoverian government to provide relief to 
Hamburg and settle the debt owed for the year 1814.
239
 What he did not state (and this was 
the point of contention) was that he expected Britain to reimburse the Hanoverian 
government on this point. In May 1815, George Best put the Hanoverian claim to 
Castlereagh, claiming that the Hanoverian government had paid for the Hanseatic Legion on 
two separate accounts (Hamburg: 24
th
 Jan – 30
th
 June 1814, and Lübeck: 24
th
 Jan – 5
th
 July 
1814), and in consequence was owed £55,437.9.2.
240
 A reply from the Duke of Wellington 
approved the repayment of a small amount owed, but further stated that it was only due to the 
union of Hanover with Britain that it was considered at all.
241
 It was not until July 1815 that 
Britain agreed in principle to reimburse Hanover the full sum given by Best two months 
previously, first with an initial payment of £30,000, the difference of which would be paid 
following a future investigation.
242
  
The issue relating to the Hanseatic subsidy was controversial on two counts. Firstly 
had Castlereagh not later stipulated to the Hansa towns' representatives that Britain would 
cover the costs of the Hanseatic Legion, the argument that Hanover was responsible for the 
debt would have more weight. Prior to Castlereagh’s intervention, the last representative of 
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the Guelphic Sovereign dealing with the issue of Hansa troops had been Count Münster. It 
could then be argued that the Hanoverian Sovereign, not the British Sovereign, had made the 
request for arms in the north of Germany, a not unreasonable assumption to draw based upon 
Hanover’s geographic location. Count Münster had, of course, been foremost in the argument 
that he represented the Hanoverian Sovereign throughout the war years. However, as 
Castlereagh subsequently promised fiscal aid, it was indeed Britain that resolved to finance 
the Hanseatic Legion in this instance. Had he not done so, it would be difficult to discern 
who, if anyone, was responsible for the upkeep of the reformed legion following the Treaty 
of Paris, as the request by Münster had been made without any proposed subsidiary aid.
243
 
The second point of contention was the initial act of the Duke of Cambridge who, despite 
making the legal case for why neither Hanover nor Britain had any obligation in this matter at 
all, formally undertook to instruct the Hanoverian Government to pay the Hanseatic debt of 
1814 in February 1815. Not only had Cambridge gone against his own persuasive reasoning 
on this point, he undertook an obligation on Hanover’s behalf in full knowledge that a 
previous convention had agreed, in principle, that Britain was to finance the Hanseatic 
Legion for the year 1814. Furthermore, Cambridge made no indication that he expected 
Britain to reimburse the Hanoverian government, a decision that obscured the financial 
responsibilities of the two countries on this matter. 
Two days following the agreed financial settlement of the Hanseatic Legion, Count 
Münster again raised the issue of subsidies with Bathurst; the issue under dispute in this case 
was the Dutch subsidy. Münster’s primary point on this subject was that the Dutch fund had 
been paid out of the Hanoverian subsidy.
244
 This particular arrangement had been agreed 
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upon in September 1814.
245
 However, by July 1815 Münster had received intelligence that 
the latest subsidy to Holland had been refused by the Dutch, who no longer wished to receive 
it. This prompted Münster to insist that the full Hanoverian balance (£50,000) was 
subsequently due to Hanover, who had only received £25,000 (The difference being the equal 
sum of £25,000 originally destined for Holland).
246
  
While Münster was able to secure an agreement in principle in August 1815,
247
 this 
minor incident is intriguing. First, the fact that Münster discovered the Dutch refusal not from 
his British counterparts, but through his own intelligence network, suggests that Britain had 
not intended to return the Dutch subsidy to the Hanoverian one. Secondly, following the 
subsidy agreement made between Wellington and Münster in August, the payment of the 
agreed balance still required further prompting from George Best in September,
248
 only 
receiving confirmation from Bathurst that he had passed the relevant instructions to the 
Treasury later that month.
249
 This particular episode, while brief in comparison to the 
Hanseatic incident, illustrates periods where British financial interests (in this case retaining a 
monthly subsidy of £25,000) were not considered to be of Hanoverian concern. Britain had 
not informed the Hanoverian Government of the cancellation of the Dutch subsidy, 
suggesting then that as of the initial split of the Hanoverian subsidy in 1814, British 
authorities had not considered Dutch aid to belong rightfully to Hanover. Alternatively, a 
cynic could argue that the British politicians accepted in private that the funds should return 
to the Hanoverian account, but retained the hope that by being silent on the issue they could 
keep the Hanoverian subsidy at fifty percent and allow the Treasury to make some savings. 
These two cases provide evidence of a strained relationship when it came to fiscal matters, 
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the first relating to payment due from Britain or Hanover to a third party, the second being a 
matter of subsidies concerning Hanover and Britain directly. A final case examines how the 
relationship operated when Hanover was owed money from a third party, that third party 
itself being financed by Britain.  
Simultaneous to the Dutch/Hanoverian issue of 1815, George Best addressed Mr. 
Hamilton over an issue relating to the Swedish debt to Hanover.
250
 The purpose of this debt 
was to cover the cost of Swedish sustenance while their troops were in Hanover. Referring to 
a treaty between Britain and Sweden in 1814, Best alluded to a secret article in which Britain 
endeavoured to withhold over £70,000 (to be accrued across the first six months instalments) 
of the 24 million francs agreed. The purpose of this was to provide security should the 
Swedish government neglect to pass the sum owed by them to the Kingdom of Hanover. 
Should the Hanoverian and Swedish governments arrange a formal liquidation of the debt in 
the meantime, then the sums held back by Britain would not be due to Hanover.
251
 Best stated 
that the Hanoverian government had succeeded in securing an arrangement of payment 
(amounting to 230,000 rixdollars) with the Swedish government in the course of the six-
month interval; the arrangement being that British subsidy bills bound for Sweden would 
instead be granted to Hanover. Best therefore requested that the British government issue the 
necessary orders to that end.
252
 The immediate impression of this letter suggests that Hanover 
and Sweden had come to a logical agreement concerning the Swedish debt, namely that 
Hanover would be paid direct from the British-Swedish subsidy in the form of British 
Treasury Bills before they entered into Sweden’s possession.  One would assume this to be an 
obvious solution, Britain having taken the responsibility to withhold certain amounts each 
month to compensate Hanover should Sweden have defaulted.  
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The British authorities, however, did not appear to draw the same conclusions. In their 
reply to Best, the Foreign Office claimed that as the Swedish and Hanoverian governments 
had reached an arrangement on settling the debt, the Swedish-Hanoverian treaty superseded 
the secret article between Britain and Sweden of the previous year.
253
 This in turn rendered 
British involvement in the Swedish-Hanoverian debt to be terminated, without the need to 
involve itself financially from that point. Mr. Best, understandably, did not agree. While 
backtracking slightly, Best stated that the Swedish government had put the proposed 
arrangement forward and the Hanoverian government, while agreeable, had yet to formally 
approve. He additionally pointed out that, in his opinion, he could not see how the secret 
article could have been superseded without the consent of all concerned parties.
254
 As Best 
had spent the past several years in the position of Count Münster’s officer for legation, his 
opinion on legal matters such as this can be viewed with a certain level of competency. 
Before getting into this legal point, however, he started his letter by claiming that in the 
interval of their correspondence he had received word of an alternative arrangement between 
the Hanoverian and Swedish governments, which would settle the matter of Swedish debt via 
Swedish funds readily available on the continent.
255
  
In this respect, the whole episode appeared to have been rendered moot by 
simultaneous affairs on the continent. As there appears to be no further communication 
between Hanover and Britain regarding the Swedish debt, the alternative arrangement does 
indeed appear to have taken place. The interesting point of this case, however, despite it 
coming to nothing, is the blatant disregard with which British authorities viewed their 
commitment in this instance. The use of such a loophole to avoid paying sums of money to 
Hanover, in spite of Swedish and Hanoverian agreement, reinforces the perception alluded to 
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in an earlier chapter that Britain did not view the Anglo-Hanoverian union as a partnership of 
equals. The British attempt to deny the Hanoverians their financial settlement could have 
cancelled out the debt in its entirety leaving Hanover without recompense. The Swedish 
could have insisted that they had made arrangement of payment via Britain, and therefore 
were not accountable should the British refuse to pay out of their own accord. That would be 
an entirely British-Hanoverian problem. It was only due to an alternative agreement being 
reached on the continent between Hanover and Sweden that this particular constitutional 
Pandora’s Box stayed shut. 
 
Congress of Vienna  
As a result of the recent bicentenary, the Congress of Vienna and the peace process as 
a whole has received an outpouring of scrutiny from historians across the world. Indeed, the 
end of the Napoleonic wars had a large enough impact upon public memory that, in spite of 
the BBC’s unending coverage of the First World War centenary, it still found time to mark 
the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo in 2015. Frustratingly, however, the more important 
anniversary of the conclusion of peace went largely unnoticed, with the exception of a 
solitary program of forty-five minutes on BBC Radio 3.
256
 In a similar manner, the Royal 
Mint went further than its usual commemorative fifty pence piece (such as the Battle of 
Trafalgar coin in 2005) by releasing a range of collective coins featuring the Heads of State 
of major powers, and their more publicly recognisable Generals. The level of public and 
academic interest that was borne out of the bicentenary has led to new perspectives and 
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studies of the peace that surpass the (somewhat dated) authoritative works like that of 
Kissinger's A World Restored. The wealth of material now available allows for the study of 
all manner of aspects concerning the peace, ranging from economic affairs along the Rhine, 
transnational policing in Germany, to the impact of demobilisation on European society.
257
 
The diplomatic debates of 1814-15, which would determine the future of Europe, 
brought men and women of illustrious rank and calibre to the centres of the various 
negotiations; whether this be the triumphal Congress of Paris, the somewhat more austere 
London Conference, or the extravagant Congress of Vienna (the latter subsequently lending 
its name collectively to the other two). Yet while Europe rejoiced at the overthrow of the 
Corsican Ogre, the theatrical encore of the Hundred Days notwithstanding, the continent 
remained braced for a future outbreak of hostilities.
258
 The central powers of Austria and 
Prussia sought to regain former territory, and the Russian presence in Poland forced their 
attention towards the former Holy Roman Empire.
259
 As Napoleon had dismembered that 
ancient German collective and constructed the alternative Rhine Confederation for his 
German clients, the timeworn securities enjoyed by autonomous rulers, had been swept 
away.
260
 This allowed for the internal borders of Germany to be entirely redrawn in line with 
the Great Powers policy of the Balance of Power.  
Similar problems could be found in the Italian peninsula. Following Napoleon’s 
conquests of that region, he had consolidated the various duchies and republics into larger 
entities, resulting in the satellite Kingdom of Italy in the north of that region when the 
Napoleonic Empire was at its peak. The dismemberment of that Kingdom fuelled Austria’s 
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ambition to reclaim hegemony in that arena.
261
 This sparked a number of debates where 
nationalism in Italy and Germany were pitted against each other, based as they were in 
opposite camps of the Austrian interest. In this case, German nationalism could be used in 
pursuance of a federal system with which Austria could compete with Prussia. Wolf Gruner 
provides a convincing argument of how a federal political model for the German territories 
provided elements of peace and security for its competitive members.
262
 In Italy, however, 
nationalism was seen as detrimental to the attempts of Austrian hegemony.
263
 Russia, proving 
obstinate in relinquishing Polish territory (partitioned as it had been between Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia, pre-Napoleon), turned Prussian efforts for recompense to the Kingdom of 
Saxony, a defeated ally of Napoleon. With ambiguous support of Austria, this issue itself 
became divisive.
264
 This ambition in turn worried the delegates of Britain, Hanover and 
Austria, who had their own ambitions for the German heartlands. Add to this mix the claims 
of every cleric, noble and sovereign displaced by the French conquests across Europe, and the 
sheer weight of the task before the European delegates becomes evident. It is no surprise to 
find episodes when tensions reached boiling point, and led to frenzied rumours of impending 
war across the European continent.  
While the British role in these negotiations has been covered extensively in histories 
dedicated to the Conferences, the impact of Hanover, while mentioned, has not been covered 
to the same extent.  The recent bicentenary has done much to reclaim this area of history for 
the lesser powers involved, but the Anglo-Hanoverian union and its constitutional 
repercussions could greatly influence the way the British element is considered, pending 
further dedicated study. Considering the prominent position Count Münster enjoyed within 
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the Hanoverian political sphere, it stands to reason that the anti-Prussian sentiments discussed 
in a previous chapter would have had some bearing on the Hanoverian position on the 
German question. Indeed, similar sentiments were shared by Prince Adolphus Frederick, the 
Duke of Cambridge, who in an undated document to Castlereagh in 1814 examined the 
dangers posed by the Prussian and Hessian sovereigns, and attempted to justify Hanoverian 
claims of expansion in line with this threat; interestingly, he claimed this was the Sovereign's 
entitled right resulting from British exertions. With regard to Prussia, Cambridge argued that 
Hanoverian expansion was necessary to provide itself with the means to defend itself from 
the ‘Incroachment [sic] of a Power, that has aimed at the destruction of all its Independent 
neighbours, ever since the beginning of the actual disturbances, and which even now offers 
Protection, in order to oppress’.
265
 A damning indictment against a British ally at a time when 
peace was sought. His words are softened somewhat by an acceptance that, for the security of 
Germany as a whole, Prussia should be a considerable power, and recommended restoring its 
lost territories. Presumably, he references the Polish territories here, as he added that should 
Prussia seek to recompense itself in Germany, then the acquisition of these non-Prussian 
subjects and alien institutions would be tantamount to theft. Of particular concern was that, at 
a future time of convenience, Prussia would exchange its proposed territories left of the 
Rhine with France in exchange for their support of a Prussian acquisition of Hanover.
266
  
The seven-page document continues with this anti-Prussian sentiment throughout, and 
after much disparagement of the perceived intentions of the Prussian state and all its 
politicians (with the exception of the King, who Cambridge merely claimed was manipulated 
easily), Cambridge turned to Hanoverian expansion as a Sovereign right of the Anglo-
Hanoverian dynasty. He claimed that the loss of Hanover would be detrimental to British 
interests, and flatters the British ego by stating that the Prussian state, while being destructive 
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to international commerce, excluded the values and liberal ideas of the British people. Indeed, 
his proclaimed defence of German liberties and British-German commerce led him to urge 
that the Hansa towns should also remain out of Prussian hands, with the suggestion that this 
become British policy. Cambridge’s attack on German sovereigns stretched to the Prince of 
Hesse, who he claimed desired the merchant town of Munden, being the concentration point 
for British exports to the rest of Germany. His reasoning here again raised the spectre of 
Prussian expansion. The plot Cambridge forecast entailed a profitable transference of 
Munden from Hesse to Prussia, thus securing the ‘heart of Westphalia’ for the latter.
267
 The 
obsessive anti-Prussian sentiments, that Cambridge took great pains to deliver, end in a rather 
abrupt fashion. The purpose of his letter was to portray Prussia as the great threat not just to 
German liberties, but to British values and commerce. To prevent this abominable tragedy, 
Cambridge proposed that Hanover secure fresh territories from its neighbours. The difference 
between Prussian and Hanoverian expansion was argued to be that a grateful Europe, 
delivered by British exertions, begged to deliver ‘homage’ to the Sovereign of that nation. 
Additionally, he claimed that the labours of the British in securing the continent from 
Napoleon entitled the Guelphic Sovereign to territorial rewards.
268
  
Cambridge’s letter leaves much to be examined, as it raises questions over Guelphic 
opinions of British allies and past war efforts. In this case we can see that the Duke of 
Cambridge may be struggling to segregate his Hanoverian interests from his British royal 
persona. The perceived threat of Prussia is not, on its own, surprising. Similar sentiments had 
been expressed on various occasions by Count Münster, the Prussian occupation of 1806 still 
fresh in the mind of the Hanoverian statesman. Münster claimed regularly throughout his 
correspondence with the Prince Regent, while stationed in Vienna, that he had little trust in 
the good-faith of Prussia, feeling obliged to get formal agreements with that power concluded 
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swiftly so as to avoid a volte-face on the Prussian side.
269
 Intriguingly, following his anti-
Prussian rhetoric, the Duke of Cambridge put forth a suggestion that blurred the jurisdictional 
realities of the personal union, and brought the jealously defended Act of Settlement into 
question. Terming Hanoverian expansion to be a right of conquest was ludicrous in itself, but 
the notion that British military efforts should be the raison d'être to secure territory, not for 
the Sovereign of the United Kingdom but for the King of Hanover, wholly contradicts the key 
principle of the Act of Settlement. That the United Kingdom would never be expected, or 
forced, to wage war for the purpose of Hanoverian aggrandisement was arguably the entire 
point of that Act. It is with marked interest that Münster did not employ this particular 
method of persuasion in securing Hanoverian territory. Certainly, efforts were made by that 
Minister to enlarge the Kingdom, and the ability to defend itself against Prussia was part of 
that argument throughout the peace process.
270
 Yet never did Münster, a staunch advocate of 
the personal union's constitutional formation, appear to contradict the Act of Settlement, the 
foundation block of the Anglo-Hanoverian union. 
Domestic constitutional issues, and the combined transference of anti-Prussian 
sentiment from Hanover to Britain, was but one factor in which the Hanoverians left a mark 
on negotiations. Count Münster, independent of his Hanoverian duties, was placed (with 
Castlereagh’s approval) upon a panel of Commissioners who would perform a task that 
would shape the negotiations and influence the future of the European continent to this day. 
The Commission in question was given the logical, scientific, and entirely unethical task of 
providing a detailed legal analysis of the European territories in dispute.
271
 The 
Commission’s findings in turn allowed the plenipotentiaries to trade souls accurately, 
theoretically allowing fairer, equitable negotiations to take place. Indeed, the efficiency with 
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which this task was performed was remarkable, allowing Münster to callously announce in 
one letter to the Prince Regent a detailed analysis of souls to be traded amongst the German 
powers. He used such terms as an ‘allotment of 20,000 inhabitants’ for the Duke of 
Oldenburg, a claim that Hanover was ‘owed’ 131,000 souls by Prussia, and that after various 
proposed trades on the latter point ‘would still leave a surplus of 6,500 souls’ with Prussia.
272
 
The trading of souls in this monetary fashion across Europe was, while quite logical, a 
disturbing element of the negotiating process. At any rate, Münster was instrumental in 
acquiring knowledge of Europe’s populations for the use of the Congress. This lends weight 
to the view that, although Hanover was not a great power in its own right, it left an 
undeniable legacy, as the competency of its politicians provided statistics that would be used 
by all parties to lay claim to territory, and ultimately finalise an international agreement on 
the borders of Europe. 
In addition to this, the Hanoverian plenipotentiary at times found himself representing 
the interests of Britain. Here too we find another example of Anglo-Hanoverian Ministers 
temporarily crossing the floor to defend the interests of the other. During the Congress of 
Paris 1814, Münster negotiated with France for the return of cultural artefacts looted from 
Hanoverian territory during its occupation. In line with these talks, Castlereagh requested that 
Münster conclude separate articles on behalf of the United Kingdom, to arrange 
compensation for the cost of keeping French prisoners of war, amongst other unnamed 
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English claims. Münster agreed to this, and subsequently informed the Prince Regent of his 
success in the matter.
273
  
In a similar manner, in January 1814 a diplomatic request was issued that portrayed 
this close cooperation in reverse. Mr. Best, who appears to have assumed Münster’s duties in 
London while the Count was abroad, addressed the Earl of Liverpool concerning 
Hanoverians in Denmark. During the expectation of a Peace Treaty with Denmark, the 
German Chancery, by order of the Prince Regent, raised concerns relating to the property and 
safety of Hanoverians in that country, primarily within the Duchy of Holstein. Best expressed 
the Hanoverian desire of gaining an amnesty from the Danish for Hanoverians who risked the 
loss of their property should Denmark pursue a policy of confiscation. In particular, Best 
mentioned a Count Kielmansegge whose family stood to lose their estates in Holstein should 
an amnesty not be forthcoming. Best pressed the point by stating the Count and other 
Hanoverians had served loyally to defeat the ‘common enemy’, and urged Liverpool to 
intercede in the Danish negotiations on Hanover’s behalf.
274
 The two cases here, while 
obscuring traditional jurisdictional remits, highlight the fluidity found within this personal 
union's political-diplomatic structure. As was similarly the case concerning maritime affairs 
addressed in an earlier chapter, here too the Anglo-Hanoverian union shows its strengths. 
Importantly, the independent nature separating Britain and Hanover was secured in both of 
the above cases, by the demand that the negotiations stipulated each country's demands in 
separate articles of the relevant treaties.
275
 This in itself secures the malleable personal union 
thesis against the composite monarchy argument. 
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Mediterranean Trade 
Britain’s diplomatic affairs concerning the Mediterranean had unintended 
consequences after the Congress of Vienna that would damage British merchants’ supremacy 
in the Mediterranean, as they would later have to compete with their Hanoverian 
counterparts. To put this into context, a brief explanation of the Barbary States and their 
situation in this period is required. The Barbary States, consisting of modern-day Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia, were highly autonomous states that owed their loyalty to the Ottoman 
Empire. By the time of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, these states were notorious 
in raiding merchant ships in the Mediterranean, be they European or American in origin.
276
 
Their aptitude at raiding also saw them carry out raids on the coastlines of southern Europe, 
ravaging the coastal settlements of Italy and Sardinia.
277
 It was not just material goods that 
were looted in these raids; prisoners were often taken as well. These captives would be held 
to ransom or taken into slavery if no ransom was forthcoming. 
This state of affairs changed once war commenced between Napoleon and the 
Coalitions. The British government would come to rely upon trade with the Ottomans, and 
could not in any event spare the resources necessary to combat the Barbary slavers in the 
Mediterranean at that time. To do so would have stretched the Navy thin and turn an 
otherwise neutral coastline hostile.
278
 To combat the slavers, Britain established treaties that 
principally served as bribes to ensure the safety of British merchantmen. These treaties would 
later be extended to cover the Hanoverians from as early as 1751,
279
 a move that would have 
unintended consequences following the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The series of events that 
followed would show how British maritime policy during the war, and their policy towards 
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slavery throughout the Vienna Congress, had an overarching benefit for Hanover in ways that 
had not been planned, and were subsequently detrimental to Britain’s own mercantile 
interests.  
Treaties established as early as the seventeenth century by British representatives in 
North Africa ensured that British merchants and their ships were to be largely spared from 
aggressive action on the part of the Barbary raiders. The non-aggression agreements formed 
in the negotiations of the British representatives resulted in what Nicholas Harding refers to 
as a British ‘Mediterranean pass’.
280
 Harding claims that this granted Britain a unique 
opportunity of being the only power that could trade throughout the Mediterranean Sea with 
impunity.
281
 Should, on occasion, British subjects be held captive by the Barbary States, they 
would be required to release them without receiving a ransom. The question later arose of 
whether these treaties applied to Hanoverian subjects. As these treaties were ratified in the 
name of George III, were Hanoverian seamen allowed to claim immunity from raiders due to 
being subjects of George in his Electoral capacity? The British response to this was to include 
Hanover and its subject peoples within the terms of subsequent negotiations with the Barbary 
States, arguing that due to the shared sovereignty of George's person the two peoples should 
be viewed as being one and the same in this case.
282
 This led Harding to claim that Hanover 
and Britain were not in practice in a personal union at all, but in fact formed a composite 
state.
283
 His argument here rested on one crucial point; namely, the manner in which these 
passes were obtained and what they implied constitutionally for the country to whom they 
were extended. To emphasise this point, Harding examined the differences Britain observed 
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between Hanover and the Kingdom of Sardinia when obtaining the necessary treaties from 
the Barbary States in 1816.  
The Kingdom of Sardinia, being an independent sovereign state in its own right, was 
seen as a vital buffer on the French border.
284
 The British attempt to obtain a pass for them 
was undoubtedly to ensure this nation’s maritime security, thus protecting its economic 
capabilities. Castlereagh legitimised the policy of acting on behalf of Sardinia as a 
consequence of ‘the general friendship and alliance that subsists between the two crowns’.
285
 
British efforts to extend these maritime securities to Hanover assumed a different 
constitutional justification. While Count Münster was successful in persuading British 
authorities to act on Hanover’s behalf,
286
 the language used by the British suggested an 
altogether different political relationship between Britain and Hanover compared to that of 
Britain and Sardinia. Although the Barbary States were to recognise the flag of the Kingdom 
of Hanover, the Hanoverians were to be treated in the same manner as ‘other countries 
belonging to the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty’.
287
  
At first, Harding would appear to be correct in suggesting that this was an indicator of 
Hanoverian subjugate status. However, the political and diplomatic history of British 
diplomacy in relation to Hanover is not taken into account. By looking to the events 
preceding 1806 and the Prussian occupation of Hanover, we see that British representatives 
refused to talk to their Prussian counterparts about Hanover as a matter of policy. When talks 
began to involve a potential Prussian stewardship of Hanover until the end of hostilities, the 
British envoy to Berlin, Lord Harrowby, pointedly remarked that Hanover fell outside of his 
remit as a British representative. Therefore, he could not discuss the matter; indeed, he was 
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not even allowed to listen.
288
 The Foreign Secretary, Charles Fox, made similar 
representations to the Prussian Ambassador in London, Baron Jacobi. When handed papers 
relating to Hanover, Fox immediately advised Jacobi to transmit these to the Hanoverian 
Minister as he had no authority over such matters.
289
  
This precedent of British politicians disowning policy matters concerning Hanover 
does not, however, indicate a sharp change in policy by 1816. While Britain did act on behalf 
of Hanover in the Barbary States, they had been asked to do so by the Hanoverian Minister. 
The use of language was in keeping with language used to explain a simplistic view of the 
Hanoverian relationship with Britain to the Barbary States.
290
 While prima facie such 
overlapping interests would indicate a composite monarchy, it would be more appropriate to 
suggest that British consuls carried out Hanoverian interests on behalf of the Hanoverian 
Minister, in a similar manner to that of aiding the Sardinians in their capacity as allies. The 
terminology used to describe the Electorate of Hanover’s relationship with Britain was 
merely simplified to ease negotiations. The British and Hanoverian crowns may have rested 
on the same head in 1816, but the question of obtaining commercial passes for Hanover 
originated with the Hanoverian Ministry, yet was negotiated by British diplomats out of 
practicality. Such a relationship is the epitome of a personal/dynastic union. Regardless of the 
complexities of the dynastic relationship between the two, Britain had secured the safe 
conduct of Hanoverian seamen in the Mediterranean. As the merchant ships of Hanover were 
small in number, Britain’s maritime strategy did not appear to consider the Hanoverian 
merchants a threat to their maritime economy. This, it would later transpire, was a mistake. 
Agreements formed at the Congress of Vienna had wide ranging implications, partly 
because of the ramifications of previous treaties. At the congress, Hanover obtained the 
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former Prussian territory of East Frisia, and consequentially, the East Frisian merchant navy. 
As a Prussian possession, the East Frisians had made inroads into the Mediterranean trade 
routes, and so due to the Vienna Congress Hanover received a mercantile fleet capable of 
competing with Britain in that theatre.
291
  The pre-established treaties secured by Britain 
ensured that Hanover was in a position to trade across the Mediterranean without fear of 
Barbary aggression. Britain was exasperated further in this case by agreements made 
regarding slavery as part of the peace process.  
The Atlantic slave trade, being equally abhorrent in nature and far more extensive 
than that carried on by the Barbary States, had been abolished as a trading practice by Britain. 
Additionally, Britain assumed the right to police that policy during the war years, and was 
suspected of wanting to retain that right (to ensure naval supremacy) at the peace table.
292
 
Understandably, the other powers were less than enthusiastic in allowing Britain to stop and 
search their own fleets at will, but a consensus on an international level regarding the slave 
trade was agreed, despite the more restrictive policy promoted by Vice-Admiral Sir Sydney 
Smith, who hoped to focus all efforts against slavery primarily on the Barbary States.
293
 Mark 
Jarrett claimed that, towards the Congress' conclusion, the strength of feeling favourable to 
halting the slave trade was such that most countries agreed that action had to be taken.
294
 
While this was a general reference to the trade as a whole, with no specific mention of the 
Mediterranean trade, the policy of ending the slave trade applied internationally. Due to this, 
Britain was hardly in a position to retract their previous agreement of Hanoverian protection, 
without looking largely hypocritical diplomatically at a time when they were attempting to 
encourage other nations such as Spain and France to abolish Atlantic slavery. Should they 
have retracted their protective policy, it could have been argued by contemporaries that 
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Britain was less interested in preventing people, regardless of their nationality/ethnicity, of 
being traded as slaves, instead hoping to use the enforced abolishment of the Atlantic slave 
trade as a means to retain their naval supremacy over the other colonial nations. Due to the 
diplomatic decisions of the war period and the subsequent peace process, Hanover went 
through a curious series of events where the British intentionally first secured their maritime 
rights, and unwittingly then aided in their acquisition of a merchant fleet as a by-product of 
the arranged Hanoverian acquisition of East Frisia. Both were moves facilitated by Britain 
that would benefit Hanover economically while building competition for British merchants, 
something that the protectionist maritime policy of Britain did not foresee or intend.  
 
Hanoverian Chelsea Pensioners 
The intricate affairs of the Anglo-Hanoverian union on diplomacy, international 
finances, and maritime rights notwithstanding, its wartime legacy could be found at a social 
level as late as February 1838. The issue in question related to the British-funded state 
pensions of King’s German Legion veterans, who were registered with the Royal Chelsea 
Hospital. The primary concern was that the problem of settling the pensioners’ financial 
claims remained a controversial issue throughout the following two decades of peace. 
Secondly, and more as a point of interest, it is notable that the legacy of the Anglo-
Hanoverian war effort in this capacity outlasted the personal union itself, which ended in 
June 1837, following the accession of Queen Victoria to the throne of the United Kingdom, 
and the Duke of Cumberland to that of Hanover. 
 In December 1837, the office of the British Secretary for War and the Colonies 
received a despatch from Hanover containing annexed correspondence between Hanoverian 
Chelsea Out-Pensioners (led by a Mr. Christian Sempf) and the British Paymaster at 
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Hannover, Mr. J. Taylor. These and the cover letter had been sent by the petitioning 
pensioners, and described a series of grievances relating to the payment and value of their 
British pensions. Estimating an annual shortcoming of ten percent, the Hanoverians argued 
they were being treated unfairly by Britain, as their pensions had remained at a fixed rate 
since the end of the war and did not rise with inflation or take into account the exchange 
rate.
295
 An underlying addition to the petitioners’ grievances, however, lay in their marked 
frustration that the British representative in Hanover (Taylor) had little to no sympathy for the 
petitioners, a frustration that led to their approaching the Office for War and Colonies 
directly.  
Found in the first of four annexed letters (Nov. 1837), Sempf described the financial 
shortcomings to Taylor and expressed his wish that Taylor could resolve the matter, and if 
not, follow it up with the relevant bodies. However, Sempf added that should the paymaster 
be unsatisfactory in this, then the petitioners were prepared to go over his head to the 
Commissioners and the British War department if necessary.
296
 Taylor’s initial response 
claimed that the Hanoverians had been added to the Chelsea lists in 1816, and were to be paid 
the fixed rate of pay of 1813, when these troops first entered Hanover, thus removing the 
requirement to raise the pension with inflation. Taylor further claimed that as the rate of pay 
was a fixed amount, there were times since 1815 when the exchange rate meant that the 
Hanoverian pensioners were receiving more in financial relief at the Government’s expense 
than they were entitled to. It was only in the last few years, he claimed, that the exchange rate 
had moved in favour of the British government in the sum of roughly ten percent.
297
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Up to this point, the correspondence between pensioner and paymaster had been quite 
cordial. Yet on receipt of Taylor’s initial explanation, Sempf’s exacerbated response results 
in what reads as a rather antagonistic exchange of letters between the two in December 1837. 
Underlining the corresponding text in his follow up letter, Sempf demanded to know ‘by 
whom the rate fixed in the year 1813 was considered a fair exchange’ and ‘by whose order 
the same Standard of payment has been continued’.
298
 Taylor at any rate responded in kind: 
‘by whom the Army rate was fixed I have to inform you that it was determined by a Board of 
Officers’, these officers being in British pay, commanded by General Count Walmoden; the 
continuation, he bluntly stated, was authorised by the ‘proper’ British departments.
299
 In any 
case, Sempf and his fellow petitioning pensioners were not satisfied with this response and 
approached the War Secretary in Britain later that same month.
300
  This initial aspect of the 
pensioners’ plight in 1837 illustrates a key point, namely that Britain had honoured the 
commitments made to Count Münster when the K.G.L. initially entered into British service as 
a subsidised ‘foreign’ corps within the British army in 1806. The fact that they had continued 
this financial commitment following the dissolution of the union in 1837 is in itself a credit to 
the legacy of that continental union. Indeed, the response of the Department for War and 
Colonies suggests that the British government of the day had every intention to continue 
honouring that obligation, as their following inquiry with the Royal Chelsea Hospital would 
imply.  
The Chelsea Hospital inquiry into the matter in 1838 reveals not only the seriousness 
with which Britain viewed its Hanoverian obligations post-union, but provides an exemplary 
account of the intricate relationship between Hanoverian and Briton during the final years of 
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the Napoleonic wars and its aftermath (as a result of the contemporaneous documents the 
inquiry researched). A letter to the Chelsea Commissioners in 1815 illustrates how the 
personal union and its constituent parts operated together on an informal setting, in this 
particular instance through the link of the Royal family. Dated July 1815, the Duke of 
Cambridge addressed the Commissioners explaining the issue of unpaid pensions. He 
explained how, since failing to receive a response to the same question in April of the same 
year, he had been compelled, at considerable expense, to fund the Hanoverian pensions. This 
had been due to a failure on the British side to make the relevant payments, and had further 
led the Duke to lobby the Hanoverian Government to assist in funding the veterans until they 
could be recompensed by the Chelsea Hospital.
301
  
On a constitutional level, this was quite extraordinary. The soon-to-be Viceroy was, 
essentially, at this time acting as the Sovereign representative of Hanover, and was directly 
contacting a British institution on matters concerning Hanover. Considering the jealously 
defended autonomy of the two countries, this should not have happened. Should another 
power have needed, for instance, a response to a query relating to British obligations to 
foreign nationals, the normal channels of communication would have been expected to be 
adhered to; that being to direct all enquiries to a British diplomat, the Foreign Secretary, or 
the British Prime Minister. That the Duke of Cambridge felt able to bypass these established 
channels and approach the Hospital directly is demonstrative of the liberties the union 
allowed some members of the Hanoverian establishment. That his method of contacting the 
Commissioners directly was potentially controversial was further emphasised by the Duke 
himself, who stated that, while being aware he should probably be using the ‘proper channels 
of representation’, he believed his approach was acceptable due to the Commissioners’ 
‘feeling[s] of Justice’ and the ‘High Character of Liberality which the British Government 
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 He emphasised the British obligation in this case by stating that many Hanoverians 
had enlisted to defend their rightful sovereign post-occupation, in full expectation of receipt 
of a British pension following a conclusion of peace.
303
 Ultimately, following a series of 
meetings within the Hospital and the British Treasury (where in addition to Hanoverian 
pensions, those of K.G.L veterans native to Switzerland and Stuttgart were included),
304
 the 
Treasury acknowledged the British obligation and authorised the Chelsea Hospital to treat 
these individuals as Chelsea Out-Patients.
305
  
The agreed system of payment in 1815 was the one with which the surviving 
Hanoverians in 1838 took issue.  The subsequent decision in 1838 was that the mode of 
payment would continue as it stood.
306
 The British authorities did at least continue their 
obligations in this regard even after the union's dissolution. However, their reason for not 
allowing the pension to vary depending on the rate of exchange was abhorrent; that the 
Hanoverian pensioners may resultantly struggle when the exchange rate was against them 
more often than the current system risked, thus forcing them to suffer at the hands of lenders 
and (most ridiculously) the ‘nefarious practices of Jews and others’.
307
 Yet regardless of the 
anti-Semitic reasoning behind the format in which pensions would be paid out, Britain had at 
least endeavoured to continue its obligations to Hanover in this instance. Indeed, the retention 
of this particular obligation to a union that had terminated is an admirable legacy of the 
Anglo-Hanoverian union, and lays the foundations for further research into the union's lasting 
impact well into the Victorian era. 
The case of Hanoverian pensions lends itself to an additional debate on inter-union 
exchange and transfer, that for reasons of space had been neglected in this thesis, but 
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deserves mention here. Torsten Riotte notes that the peculiarity of the personal union has led 
scholars to attempt to define its character by studying how much interchange took place 
between the two parties.
308
 The purpose of these studies being to determine the depth of the 
Anglo-Hanoverian relationship across all walks of life, be it political, social, educational, etc. 
For instance, Riotte highlights the informal academic connections between the University of 
Göttingen and British institutions. These connections appear to have been promoted from 
within academia, independently of any political pressure, suggesting that the union could 
have provided mutual benefit outside of the political arena.
309
 With such interchange taking 
place, it is not entirely surprising to find the Duke of Cambridge taking the liberties he did, 
while holding some reservations as to the political legality of such action. This case, and the 
wider debates on Anglo-Hanoverian transfer, further highlight the ambiguous nature of the 
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Conclusion: A Provident Union? 
 
 As a direct consequence of the Napoleonic Wars, the Anglo-Hanoverian union 
endured a period of strife it had not experienced before. Indeed, had Napoleon proved to be 
the victor, the union would in all likelihood have ceased to exist. The prolonged occupation 
of the Electorate, and the resulting relocation of its' administrative centre to London, thrust 
the two constituent polities of the union together in a way that had not been anticipated. Due 
to this, the Napoleonic period is essential to understand the potential political influence the 
union could provide, and sustain. The forced cohabitation of London by both British and 
Hanoverian governments saw the union's influence touch upon British domestic affairs, 
Whitehall-Crown relations, and even British naval policy. Hanoverian influence on British 
naval policy is astounding when the Hanoverian's lack of naval heritage is considered. Even 
after the war had ended, the implications of the union's wartime policies were still being felt, 
some lasting well beyond the dissolution of the union itself. Yet despite the close 
collaboration that ensued, and the occasional dispute, the principles laid out by the Act of 
Settlement, and embodied in George III, were sustained and acknowledged by statesmen on 
both sides. At times, the constitutional ambiguity of the union was abused to help in disputes 
between the two polities, but the predominant view of politicians across the Guelphic 
territories was to leave their counterparts to their own devices, and aid each other in the war 
effort against a common enemy, in a capacity not dissimilar to that of simple allies.  
 Throughout this thesis it emerges that the German Chancery had to involve itself in 
British domestic affairs to safeguard the interests of Hanoverians who had left the continent. 
The Chancery's principal minister, Count Münster, thus turned his hand to all manner of 
domestic affairs. Through issues relating to tax, the British Home Front, and British 
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philanthropy, Münster worked consistently for the betterment of Hanover and its people. 
However throughout his correspondence we can see that while there was certainly a close 
working relationship, primarily with the Foreign Office. This relationship centred on mutual 
cooperation, and does not tally with Brendan Simms’ assertion of a manipulative Hanoverian 
influence in British politics. British politics had to adapt to Hanoverian situations certainly, 
but so did policy have to adapt in relation to events concerning other European states, be they 
Russia, Spain, or more so Prussia. In the case of Prussia, British policy change may have 
taken a course contrary to the preferred option because of the Hanoverian connection, but that 
is not to say that it was a manipulation on the Hanoverian's part, more that it was just the 
political reality of the times. Münster’s profound belief in the independent nature of Hanover 
further suggests this; admittedly he did enjoy a closer proximity to British politicians than 
dignitaries from other European courts, but this was to be expected. Britain and Hanover may 
have shared the same sovereign (in body at least), but remained independent in terms of their 
politics.  
 The union could at least offer mutual benefits to the two polities from which it was 
formed. At times the requests from Münster can appear somewhat forceful in nature, 
especially when we turn to the matter of the Hanoverian groomsmen. Yet as his nation had 
been under enemy occupation, it is unsurprising that he argued for his countrymen to be 
viewed as refugees, especially when the status of other émigrés is considered. It is even 
arguable that Münster embodied the spirit of the union as laid out by George III, his 
correspondence on domestic issues certainly implies as much. While in the domestic arena 
Britain was less adamant on a separation of the two states when it came to obtaining taxes 
and militia service from Hanoverian's in Britain, Münster repeatedly reverted to the principle 
of independence guaranteed within a personal union. Hanoverians in Britain were displaced 
refugees and nothing more. Occasionally he prevailed, at times he did not, and on the 
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occasion that the British view succeeded, it was on very ambiguous grounds that in itself 
could have caused a legal debate on Britain’s duties regarding the defence of Hanover. This, 
however, was a position Münster did not pursue and supports further the claim that he 
adamantly believed in the separation within the union. Count Münster’s writings on the 
constitutional nature of the union show us its importance in relation to British history. 
Münster's importance as an individual should in turn be recognised as instrumental in 
recognising the policy aims of George III when it came to retaining the distinction between 
his two sovereign states. 
 The presence of the union, and it's inherent flexibility, could be seen even outside of 
domestic affairs. The maritime relationship was a crucial example of this, all the more so 
when the Hanoverian's negligible naval assets are accounted for. In the north of Germany, the 
unpopularity of Napoleon's Continental System, and the corruption of the men charged with 
policing its implementation, allowed for a large-scale smuggling operation to generate. By 
using Heligoland and Gothenburg as bases of operations, the British were able to continue a 
semblance of continental trade. The protective measures, enforced by the Royal Navy, 
ensured that the illicit trade of British goods flourished. These closely guarded convoys 
allowed for a secure system of communication between Count Münster and his continental 
contacts, and was arguably an unplanned by-product of British naval strategy, but one that 
would prove to be beneficial for Britain when we consider the frequency with which Münster 
would share intelligence. The Royal Navy’s impact on securing the communication links 
between London and the continent, while being difficult to ascertain fully, remains in its 
nature a naval benefit that boosted the security of Münster’s intelligence network. This is all 
the more important when the inadequacy of the British diplomatic service is considered.
310
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This particular aspect in northern Europe provided for mutually beneficial intelligence 
networks; Hanoverian agents supplying information under protection of the Royal Navy.  
 The subsequent affairs in southern Europe were less than beneficial for Britain but 
favourable to Hanover, and did not echo the cooperation found in the northern seas. The need 
to secure safe trade routes in the Mediterranean required some form of settlement with the 
Barbary States, and by achieving this end, Britain not only ensured safe passage for their own 
merchant fleet, but additionally that of Hanover. Although Hanover did not retain anything 
close to a mercantile fleet at that time, the political nicety of securing the same privileges for 
the Hanoverians as those enjoyed by the British merchants suggests an amicable relationship 
that would in this immediate sense benefit Hanover on paper with no actual economic threat 
being posed to Britain’s own mercantile interests. However, as has been explained, Hanover 
later acquired a sizeable merchant fleet due to their assimilation of the province of East Frisia 
at the Vienna Congress. The prior arrangements secured with the Barbary States by Britain 
would prove fortuitous in securing the safe passage of a merchant fleet that would be able to 
compete with Britain’s own trade in the area. These unforeseen conditions were an 
unfortunate result of Britain’s maritime policy in the Mediterranean and their own generosity 
in extending that policy to their Hanoverian cousins at a time when it was little more than an 
empty gesture.  
 Similarly, the union proved to be beneficial during the peace process. As Britain and 
Hanover were represented independently to one another, their respective diplomats could 
safeguard their own interests. Yet their close allegiance, and the trust that Münster had 
cultivated with Castlereagh over the course of the war, meant that the two dignitaries could 
work in concert with each other to further their agendas, Hanover benefitting from the 
influential support Britain had to offer. For Castlereagh, this meant that he would be privy to 
the exclusively German negotiations between the former courts of the Holy Roman Empire, 
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as Münster would inform him of what transpired in these talks. Thus Castlereagh was in a 
position to adjust his negotiating strategy accordingly in the wider negotiations. This would 
have been of significant advantage in the diplomatic manoeuvrings and bargaining maelstrom 
that embodied the Congress. The years 1814 and 1815 did at times cause friction, mainly 
over financial matters, but these were largely overcome by further negotiation. What the issue 
of subsidies proves, however, is that even when a Hanoverian administration was returned to 
the former Electorate, constitutional ambiguities remained. The decision of the Duke of 
Cambridge (as George III's royal representative in Hanover) to settle a Hanseatic debt is 
proof of this. His assumption that the Hanoverian government would be reimbursed by the 
British, the original debtor, was an interesting development that goes to the heart of the 
union's constitutional position. If the British had taken the view that Hanover could not act on 
their behalf in this matter, then we would be left with the peculiar position of a Royal 
dignitary directly handling British foreign policy. An abuse of royal authority that does not 
just question the constitutional format of the union but even that of the relationship between 
the British Crown and it's Parliament.  
 A true test of the depth of influence and success of Anglo-Hanoverian relations during 
the Napoleonic Wars, would be to examine the legacy of the union on its respective 
members. In Britain, the union was reported to have died with a whimper, with little interest 
or remorse being shown when the two Kingdoms split apart in 1837. The only noteworthy 
part of the dissolution which received popular interest, was the knowledge that the unpopular 
Duke of Cumberland would be leaving Britain to rule Hanover. In Hanover itself the 
separation was warmly welcomed. For the first time since 1714, Hanover had a permanent 
resident sovereign. One would think the two Kingdoms were glad to be rid of each other. Yet 
the legacy of the union permeated the two well after 1837. Britain remained committed to its 
Hanoverian war veterans, and while disputes over the value of these pensions did exist, the 
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fact that the pensions continued at all is noteworthy. It could even be argued that the war 
years were embryonic of Hanoverian nationalism and Guelphic loyalties. From the 
commencement of war in 1803 to the Restoration, Hanoverians were faced with a choice. 
Conform to the Napoleonic system, or trust that the House of Guelph would return. For those 
Hanoverians who were in Britain, their policies worked towards Hanover's restitution, but 
crucially, through disagreements with British Ministers, the arguments for autonomy and 
independence became imprinted in political discourse. That Guelphic loyalty, high 
autonomy/independence, and Hanoverian identity became prominent political issues for the 
new Prussian-German regime post-1866 is unsurprising.  
 The years 1802-1815 are crucial in understanding the extent of the Hanoverian's 
influence in British politics. The dynastic ties certainly meant that the opportunity for 
cooperation existed and, significantly, ensured a safe haven for the Hanoverian 
administration during the years of occupation. The unprecedented success of the German 
Chancery's principle minister, Count Münster, in cultivating working relationships with the 
British Cabinet is a clear indicator of the union's potential for internal collaboration. Yet it is 
clear that both sides remained within their respective spheres, and with very few exceptions, 
would not suggest a point of policy that refuted the principles of the Act of Settlement. As 
such it is not the case that Münster could manipulate British policy directly. That is not to say 
that Britain had any power over Hanover in a composite sense. Yes, Hanoverians fought 
within the British army as the King's German Legion, but specific ordinances had been 
agreed specifying the temporary nature of this arrangement. These men were essentially 
fighting for their Elector in the only military force still available to him. This was pragmatism 
at its best. The Hanoverian memorial at Waterloo, in a separate location to that of the British, 
is symbolic of the independent nature of the union, a union that allowed for a combined effort 
against a common enemy.  
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 With direct influence being ruled out, we return to the principles of soft power and a 
less direct approach to influencing decision-making. Through their network of agents in 
Central Europe, the German Chancery could help inform the relevant British ministers of 
important factors in need of consideration. Likewise the British were unwilling to dominate 
Hanoverian decisions while the administration was resident in London. The rare attempts to 
do so would be met with stern resistance from the Chancery and their Elector. The Anglo-
Hanoverian union was an entity that jealously upheld the spirit of the Act of Settlement. 
Mutual collaboration and the cultivation of profitable political relationships was more 
prevalent than any Machiavellian attempts to manipulate policy. The union, clearly, was not a 
composite monarchy, or a union where hard power was utilised to achieve dominance. Yet, 
the cross-polity relationship of George III's Hanoverian and British statesmen, shows that 
neither was it a personal union as we currently understand them. This was a union of 
pragmatism, negotiation, and fluid constitutional debate that penetrated all areas of policy. A 
union whose combined influence on politics and society would be felt in both Britain and 
Hanover well after its dissolution.  
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